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Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement

Author

Listed:
  • David Delacrétaz
  • Scott Duke Kominers
  • Alexander Teytelboym

Abstract

Current refugee resettlement processes account for neither the preferences of refugees nor the priorities of hosting communities. We introduce a new framework for matching with multidimensional knapsack constraints that captures the (possibly multidimensional) sizes of refugee families and the capacities of communities. We propose four refugee resettlement mechanisms and two solution concepts that can be used in refugee resettlement matching under various institutional and informational constraints. Our theoretical results and simulations using refugee resettlement data suggest that preference-based matching mechanisms can improve match efficiency, respect priorities of communities, and incentivize refugees to report where they would prefer to settle.

Suggested Citation

  • David Delacrétaz & Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym, 2023. "Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(10), pages 2689-2717, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:113:y:2023:i:10:p:2689-2717
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210096
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    Cited by:

    1. Miralles, Antonio & Pycia, Marek, 2021. "Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    2. Maximilian Kasy & Alexander Teytelboym, 2020. "Adaptive Combinatorial Allocation," Papers 2011.02330, arXiv.org.
    3. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021. "Assignments with Ethical Concerns," CARF F-Series CARF-F-514, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    4. Devansh Jalota & Michael Ostrovsky & Marco Pavone, 2022. "Matching with Transfers under Distributional Constraints," Papers 2202.05232, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
    5. Samuel Dooley & John P. Dickerson, 2020. "The Affiliate Matching Problem: On Labor Markets where Firms are Also Interested in the Placement of Previous Workers," Papers 2009.11867, arXiv.org.
    6. Dilek Sayedahmed, 2022. "Centralized refugee matching mechanisms with hierarchical priority classes," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 7(1), pages 71-111, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • J15 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
    • J18 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Public Policy

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