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David Delacretaz

Personal Details

First Name:David
Middle Name:
Last Name:Delacretaz
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RePEc Short-ID:pde1194
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://daviddelacretaz.net

Affiliation

Economics Group, Nuffield College
Department of Economics
Oxford University

Oxford, United Kingdom
http://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/Research/Economics-Group/Pages/Economics.aspx
RePEc:edi:egpoxuk (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. David Delacrétaz & Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym, 2019. "Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement," Working Papers 2019-078, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.

Articles

  1. David Delacrétaz & Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym, 2023. "Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(10), pages 2689-2717, October.
  2. Delacrétaz, David & Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2022. "When Walras meets Vickrey," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
  3. Troyan, Peter & Delacrétaz, David & Kloosterman, Andrew, 2020. "Essentially stable matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 370-390.
  4. Delacrétaz, David & Kominers, Scott Duke & Nichifor, Alexandru, 2020. "Comparative statics for size-dependent discounts in matching markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 127-131.
  5. Delacrétaz, David & Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M. & Wilkening, Tom, 2019. "Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 416-454.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. David Delacrétaz & Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym, 2019. "Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement," Working Papers 2019-078, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.

    Cited by:

    1. Yao Cheng & Jingsheng Yu & Ling Zheng, 2025. "Efficient Major Transition Exchange under Distributional and Dual Priority-respecting Constraints," Papers 2504.12727, arXiv.org, revised May 2025.
    2. Federico Echenique & Teddy Mekonnen & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2024. "Diversity in Choice as Majorization," Papers 2407.17589, arXiv.org.
    3. Troyan, Peter, 2024. "(Non-)obvious manipulability of rank-minimizing mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    4. Imamura, Kenzo & Kawase, Yasushi, 2024. "Efficient matching under general constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 197-207.
    5. De Groote, Olivier & Rho, Minyoung, 2024. "Matching Disadvantaged Children to Day Care: Evidence from a Centralized Platform," IZA Discussion Papers 17547, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Doğan, Battal & Erdil, Aytek, 2025. "Widening access in university admissions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
    7. Cilali, Buket & Barker, Kash & González, Andrés D. & Salo, Ahti, 2024. "Two-stage stochastic program for environmental resettlement decision-making," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    8. Devansh Jalota & Michael Ostrovsky & Marco Pavone, 2022. "Matching with Transfers under Distributional Constraints," Papers 2202.05232, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
    9. Maximilian Kasy & Alexander Teytelboym, 2020. "Adaptive Combinatorial Allocation," Papers 2011.02330, arXiv.org.
    10. Yoan Hermstrüwer, 2025. "Procedural Information as a “Game Changer” in School Choice," Games, MDPI, vol. 16(3), pages 1-36, May.
    11. Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Hu, Gaoji & Li, Jiangtao, 2024. "Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    12. Romm, Assaf & Roth, Alvin E. & Shorrer, Ran I., 2024. "Stability vs. no justified envy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 357-366.
    13. Pycia, Marek & Miralles, Antonio, 2020. "Foundations of Pseudomarkets: Walrasian Equilibria for Discrete Resources," CEPR Discussion Papers 15161, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Samuel Dooley & John P. Dickerson, 2020. "The Affiliate Matching Problem: On Labor Markets where Firms are Also Interested in the Placement of Previous Workers," Papers 2009.11867, arXiv.org.
    15. Stroh-Maraun, Nadja, 2024. "Weighted school choice problems and the weighted top trading cycles mechanism," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 49-56.
    16. Wataru ISHIDA & Yusuke IWASE & Taro KUMANO, 2024. "Efficient and (or) fair allocations under market-clearing constraints," Discussion papers e-24-004, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
    17. Dilek Sayedahmed, 2022. "Centralized refugee matching mechanisms with hierarchical priority classes," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 7(1), pages 71-111, December.
    18. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021. "Assignments with Ethical Concerns," CARF F-Series CARF-F-514, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.

Articles

  1. David Delacrétaz & Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym, 2023. "Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(10), pages 2689-2717, October.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Delacrétaz, David & Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2022. "When Walras meets Vickrey," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.

    Cited by:

    1. Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx, 2023. "Bilateral Trade with Multiunit Demand and Supply," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(2), pages 1146-1165, February.
    2. Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2023. "Asymptotically optimal prior-free asset market mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 68-90.
    3. Francisco Robles & Marina Núñez & Laura Robles, 2024. "Monotonic transformation of preferences and Walrasian equilibrium in allocation problems," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2024/478, University of Barcelona School of Economics.

  3. Troyan, Peter & Delacrétaz, David & Kloosterman, Andrew, 2020. "Essentially stable matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 370-390.

    Cited by:

    1. Mustafa Oğuz Afacan & Inácio Bó & Bertan Turhan, 2023. "Assignment maximization," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(1), pages 123-138, February.
    2. Hirata, Daisuke & 平田, 大祐 & Kasuya, Yusuke & 糟谷, 祐介 & Tomoeda, Kentaro & 友枝, 健太郎, 2019. "Stability against Robust Deviations in the Roommate Problem," Discussion Papers 2019-03, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    3. Clayton Thomas, 2024. "Priority-Neutral Matching Lattices Are Not Distributive," Papers 2404.02142, arXiv.org.
    4. Pablo R. Arribillaga & Eliana Pepa Risma, 2023. "Obvious Manipulations in Matching with and without Contracts," Working Papers 257, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    5. Mustafa Oğuz Afacan, 2023. "Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 95(3), pages 465-484, October.
    6. Battal Doğan & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2023. "When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1145-1173, November.
    7. Troyan, Peter, 2024. "(Non-)obvious manipulability of rank-minimizing mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    8. R. Pablo Arribillaga & Beatriz Millan & Eliana Pepa Risma, 2025. "Obvious Manipulations, Stability, and Efficiency in Matching Markets with No, Unitary, and Multiple Contracts: Three Different Results," Working Papers 363, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    9. Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2021. "A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design," ECON - Working Papers 393, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    10. Li Chen, 2023. "Timing of preference submissions under the Boston mechanism," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(4), pages 803-820, August.
    11. Doğan, Battal & Erdil, Aytek, 2025. "Widening access in university admissions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
    12. Xiang Han & Junxiao Zhang, 2025. "Characterizing priorities for deferred acceptance with or without outside options," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 79(2), pages 497-517, March.
    13. Dur, Umut & Hammond, Robert G. & Kesten, Onur, 2021. "Sequential school choice: Theory and evidence from the field and lab," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    14. Zhang, Luosai, 2025. "The properness of weak stability notions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 247(C).
    15. Kang Rong & Qianfeng Tang & Yongchao Zhang, 2024. "The core of school choice problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 77(3), pages 783-800, May.
    16. Hirata, Daisuke & Kasuya, Yusuke & Tomoeda, Kentaro, 2023. "Weak stability against robust deviations and the bargaining set in the roommate problem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C).
    17. Claudia Cerrone & Yoan Hermstrüwer & Onur Kesten, 2024. "School Choice with Consent: an Experiment," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(661), pages 1760-1805.
    18. Ryo Shirakawa, 2022. "Coordinated Strategic Manipulations and Mechanisms in School Choice," Discussion Paper Series DP2022-25, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    19. Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2024. "School choice with transferable student characteristics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 103-124.
    20. Minoru Kitahara & Yasunori Okumura, 2023. "School Choice with Multiple Priorities," Papers 2308.04780, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
    21. Romm, Assaf & Roth, Alvin E. & Shorrer, Ran I., 2024. "Stability vs. no justified envy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 357-366.
    22. Qianfeng Tang & Yongchao Zhang, 2021. "Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(2), pages 533-552, March.
    23. Troyan, Peter & Morrill, Thayer, 2020. "Obvious manipulations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    24. Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Pepa Risma, Eliana, 2025. "Obvious manipulations in matching with and without contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 70-81.
    25. Battal Dogan & Lars Ehlers, 2020. "Blocking pairs versus blocking students: Stability comparisons in school choice," Cahiers de recherche 2020-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    26. Minoru Kitahara & Yasunori Okumura, 2021. "Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 971-987, December.

  4. Delacrétaz, David & Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M. & Wilkening, Tom, 2019. "Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 416-454.

    Cited by:

    1. Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx, 2021. "Coordinated Effects in Merger Review," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(4), pages 705-744.
    2. Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx, 2023. "Bilateral Trade with Multiunit Demand and Supply," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(2), pages 1146-1165, February.
    3. Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2020. "Digital monopolies: Privacy protection or price regulation?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    4. Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2020. "Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    5. Peter Chen & Michael Egesdal & Marek Pycia & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2021. "Quantile Stable Mechanisms," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(2), pages 1-9, May.
    6. Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2019. "The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 101-106.
    7. Tobias Widmer & Paul Karaenke & Vijayan Sugumaran, 2021. "Two‐sided service markets: Effects of quality differentiation on market efficiency," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(3), pages 588-604, April.
    8. Delacrétaz, David & Kominers, Scott Duke & Nichifor, Alexandru, 2020. "Comparative statics for size-dependent discounts in matching markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 127-131.
    9. Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx, 2022. "Incomplete Information Bargaining with Applications to Mergers, Investment, and Vertical Integration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(2), pages 616-649, February.
    10. Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2020. "A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 1-15.

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