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Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement

  • Alcalde, Jose

    ()

    (Instituto Interuniversitario de Desarrollo Social y Paz)

  • Romero-Medina, Antonio

    (Departamento de Economía)

This paper provides an ‘escape route’ from the efficiency-equity trade-off in the School Choice problem. We achieve our objective by presenting a weak notion of fairness, called τ-fairness, which is always non-empty. Then, we propose the adoption of the Student Optimal Compensating Exchange Place rule, a procedure that assigns a τ-fair allocation to each problem. When students’ preferences are restricted to satisfy the Top Dominance condition (Alcalde and Barberà, 1994), the mechanism is strategy-proof.

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Paper provided by Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica in its series QM&ET Working Papers with number 14-1.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 13 Feb 2014
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ris:qmetal:2014_001
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  1. Varian, Hal R., 1974. "Equity, envy, and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 63-91, September.
  2. Aytek Erdil & Haluk Ergin, 2008. "What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 669-89, June.
  3. Onur Kesten, 2010. "School Choice with Consent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 125(3), pages 1297-1348, August.
  4. Alcalde, José & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2011. "Fair School Placement," QM&ET Working Papers 11-1, Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica.
  5. Ergin, Haluk & Sonmez, Tayfun, 2006. "Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 215-237, January.
  6. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2006. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001022, UCLA Department of Economics.
  7. Roth, Alvin E., 1982. "Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 127-132.
  8. ALCADE-UNZU, Jorge & MOLIS, Elena, . "Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2331, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
  10. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Pathak, Parag Abishek & Roth, Alvin E., 2009. "Strategy-Proofness Versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match," Scholarly Articles 11077572, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  11. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sönmez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 729-747, June.
  12. Alvin E. Roth & Uriel G. Rothblum, 1999. "Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets--In Search of Advice for Participants," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 21-44, January.
  13. Alcalde, Jose, 1996. "Implementation of Stable Solutions to Marriage Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 240-254, April.
  14. José Alcalde, 1995. "Exchange-Proofness or Divorce-Proofness? Stability in One-Sided Matching Markets," Working Papers. Serie AD 1995-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  15. Haluk I. Ergin, 2002. "Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2489-2497, November.
  16. Alcalde, J. & Barberà, S., 1992. "Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 196.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  17. Balinski, Michel & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 73-94, January.
  18. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Yeon-Koo Che & Yosuke Yasuda, 2011. "Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The "Boston Mechanism" Reconsidered," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(1), pages 399-410, February.
  19. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2009. "Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 717, Boston College Department of Economics.
  20. Ehlers, Lars & Erdil, Aytek, 2010. "Efficient assignment respecting priorities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 1269-1282, May.
  21. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun S�nmez, 2005. "The Boston Public School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 368-371, May.
  22. Martinez, Ruth & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge, 2000. "Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 91-105, March.
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