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Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership

  • Michel Le Breton


    (Universit de Toulouse 1, GREMAQ and IDEI, Toulouse, France)

  • Juan D. Moreno-Ternero


    (U. de Mlaga, U. Pablo de Olavide y CORE, Universit catholique de Louvain)

  • Alexei Savvateev


    (New Economic School, Moscow, Russia)

  • Shlomo Weber


    (Southern Methodist University, USA, and the New Economic School, Moscow, Russia)

This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no coalition would reject a proposed arrangement. When projects are indivisible, stable allocations may fail to exist and, for those cases, we resort to the least core in order to estimate the degree of instability. We also examine the compatibility of stability and fairness in metric environments with indivisible projects, where we also explore the performance of well-known solutions, such as the Shapley value and the nucleolus.

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Paper provided by Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 10.16.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pab:wpaper:10.16
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