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Characterizing group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money

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  • Hiroki Shinozaki

    (Hitotsubashi University)

Abstract

We study the object allocation problem with money. The owner possesses a single object, and each agent has preferences that are not necessarily quasi-linear. We examine various group incentive properties, which are classified according to the following criteria: (i) whether the group incentive property is weak or strong, (ii) the maximum number of agents who may form a coalition, (iii) whether only self-enforcing manipulations are considered, (iv) whether agents in a coalition can reallocate the object among themselves after misrepresenting their preferences, and (v) whether agents in a coalition can arrange side payments among themselves. We characterize the classes of rules that satisfy various group incentive properties, along with a mild property of non-imposition. Furthermore, we establish the revelation principles for rules that satisfy the group incentive properties.

Suggested Citation

  • Hiroki Shinozaki, 2025. "Characterizing group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 64(4), pages 721-764, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:64:y:2025:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-024-01554-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01554-x
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