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Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects

Author

Listed:
  • Ranojoy Basu

    (Indian Institute of Management Udaipur)

  • Conan Mukherjee

    (Economics Group, Indian Institute of Management Calcutta)

Abstract

This paper characterizes Vickrey auction with reserve price [VARP], in single and multiple objects settings, using normative and strategic axioms. In particular, it provides a new interpretation of reserve price as the infimum of a particular set of non-negative real numbers. In the single object case, we find that a strategyproof mechanism satisfies anonymity in welfare, agent sovereignty and non-bossiness in decision if and only if it has a VARP allocation rule. We extend this result to the multiple objects setting by introducing a continuity condition, and showing that any reasonable sale procedure (fixed prior to the realization of the number of available objects) involving continuous and strategyproof mechanisms that satisfy the aforementioned properties: must always use VARP with a fixed reserve price.

Suggested Citation

  • Ranojoy Basu & Conan Mukherjee, 2023. "Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(4), pages 763-790, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:27:y:2023:i:4:d:10.1007_s10058-022-00320-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00320-8
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    Keywords

    Anonymity in welfare; Agent sovereignty; Non-bossiness in decision; Continuity; Strategyproof mechanism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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