Auction design in the presence of collusion
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- Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2015. "Bribing in second-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 191-205.
- Meng, Dawen & Tian, Guoqiang, 2014. "Collusion-Proof Mechanism Design in Two-Agent Nonlinear Pricing Environments," MPRA Paper 57931, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Marquez, Robert & Singh, Rajdeep, 2013. "The economics of club bidding and value creation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 493-505.
- Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Papers 1405, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
- Sylvain Chassang & Juan Ortner, 2017. "Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement," Working Papers 072_2015, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
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- Gorkem Celik, 2015. "Implementation by Gradual Revelation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 271-296, June.
- Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo, 2009. "Optimal collusion-proof auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 565-603, March.
- Olga Gorelkina, 2014. "Bidder Collusion and the Auction with Target Bids," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_10, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
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- M. Bumin Yenmez, 2013. "Incentive-Compatible Matching Mechanisms: Consistency with Various Stability Notions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 120-141, November.
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- Xiaogang Che & Tilman Klumpp, 2016. "Entry Deterrence in Dynamic Second-Price Auctions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 168-201, May.
- Asseyer, Andreas, 2016. "Optimal Information Disclosure and Collusion," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145779, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
More about this item
KeywordsCollusion; mechanism design; auctions;
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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