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Gregory Pavlov

Personal Details

First Name:Gregory
Middle Name:
Last Name:Pavlov
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:ppa352
http://economics.uwo.ca/faculty/pavlov/

Affiliation

Department of Economics
University of Western Ontario

London, Canada
http://economics.uwo.ca/

: (519) 661-3500
(519) 661-3666
Faculty of Social Sciences, London, Ontario, N6A 5C2
RePEc:edi:deuwoca (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Gregory Pavlov, 2013. "Correlated Equilibria and Communication Equilibria in All-pay Auctions," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20132, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  2. Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2012. "Communication in Cournot Oligopoly," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20121, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  3. Gregory Pavlov, 2010. "Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20103, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  4. Gregory Pavlov, 2010. "A Property of Solutions to Linear Monopoly Problems," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20102, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  5. Zvika Neeman & Gregory Pavlov, 2010. "Renegotiation-proof Mechanism Design," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20101, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  6. Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2008. "How to Talk to Multiple Audiences," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20081, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  7. Maria Goltsman & Johannes Horner & Gregory Pavlov & Francesco Squintani, 2007. "Arbitration, Mediation and Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers 1445, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Gregory Pavlov, 2006. "Maximal Loss from Collusion in the IPV Symmetric Auctions," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-037, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  9. Gregory Pavlov, 2006. "Optimal Mechanism for Selling Substitutes," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-014, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  10. Gregory Pavlov, 2006. "Colluding on Participation Decisions," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-030, Boston University - Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2014. "Communication in Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 152-176.
  2. Neeman, Zvika & Pavlov, Gregory, 2013. "Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 473-501.
  3. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2011. "How to talk to multiple audiences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 100-122, May.
  4. Pavlov Gregory, 2011. "Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-35, February.
  5. Pavlov Gregory, 2011. "A Property of Solutions to Linear Monopoly Problems," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-18, February.
  6. Goltsman, Maria & Hörner, Johannes & Pavlov, Gregory & Squintani, Francesco, 2009. "Mediation, arbitration and negotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1397-1420, July.
  7. Pavlov, Gregory, 2008. "Auction design in the presence of collusion," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(3), September.
  8. Pavlov, Gregory, 2008. "Maximal loss from collusion in IPV symmetric auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 345-348, May.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Gregory Pavlov, 2013. "Correlated Equilibria and Communication Equilibria in All-pay Auctions," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20132, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Christian Ewerhart, 2017. "The lottery contest is a best-response potential game," ECON - Working Papers 242, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Mar 2017.

  2. Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2012. "Communication in Cournot Oligopoly," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20121, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Ganguly, Chirantan & Ray, Indrajit, 2015. "Information-Revelation and Coordination Using Cheap Talk in a Game with Two-Sided Private Information," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2015/7, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
    2. Josef Schroth, 2016. "Supervising Financial Regulators," Staff Working Papers 16-52, Bank of Canada.
    3. Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka & In-Uck Park, 2017. "Coordination of Humanitarian Aid," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 17/691, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    4. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2013. "Information-Revelation and Coordination Using Cheap Talk in a Battle of the Sexes with Two-Sided Private Information," Discussion Papers 13-01r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    5. Josef Schroth, 2015. "Risk Sharing in the Presence of a Public Good," Staff Working Papers 15-27, Bank of Canada.

  3. Gregory Pavlov, 2010. "Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20103, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Sergiu Hart & Philip J. Reny, 2012. "Maximal Revenue with Multiple Goods: Nonmonotonicity and Other Observations," Discussion Paper Series dp630, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    2. Mark Armstrong, 2016. "Nonlinear Pricing," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 8(1), pages 583-614, October.
    3. Menicucci, Domenico & Hurkens, Sjaak & Jeon, Doh-Shin, 2015. "On the optimality of pure bundling for a monopolist," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 33-42.
    4. Hart, Sergiu & Nisan, Noam, 2017. "Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 313-347.
    5. Pavlov Gregory, 2011. "A Property of Solutions to Linear Monopoly Problems," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-18, February.
    6. Tang, Pingzhong & Wang, Zihe, 2017. "Optimal mechanisms with simple menus," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 54-70.
    7. Mark Armstrong, 2012. "A More General Theory of Commodity Bundling," Economics Series Working Papers 624, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    8. Hurkens, Sjaak & Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2013. "Dominance and Competitive Bundling," TSE Working Papers 13-423, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    9. Antonio Rosato, 2016. "Selling substitute goods to loss-averse consumers: limited availability, bargains, and rip-offs," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 47(3), pages 709-733, August.
    10. Rochet, Jean-Charles & Thanassoulis, John, 2017. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination with Multiple Products," CEPR Discussion Papers 12034, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Cai, Yang & Daskalakis, Constantinos, 2015. "Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 266-305.
    12. Beccuti, Juan & Möller, Marc, 2018. "Dynamic adverse selection with a patient seller," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 95-117.

  4. Gregory Pavlov, 2010. "A Property of Solutions to Linear Monopoly Problems," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20102, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Gregory Pavlov, 2010. "Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20103, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
    2. Tang, Pingzhong & Wang, Zihe, 2017. "Optimal mechanisms with simple menus," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 54-70.
    3. Briest, Patrick & Chawla, Shuchi & Kleinberg, Robert & Weinberg, S. Matthew, 2015. "Pricing lotteries," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 144-174.
    4. Rochet, Jean-Charles & Thanassoulis, John, 2017. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination with Multiple Products," CEPR Discussion Papers 12034, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

  5. Zvika Neeman & Gregory Pavlov, 2010. "Renegotiation-proof Mechanism Design," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20101, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. David Rahman, 2012. "But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2767-2797, October.

  6. Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2008. "How to Talk to Multiple Audiences," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20081, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Liang, Pinghan, 2013. "Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary," MPRA Paper 45271, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Makoto Shimoji, 2016. "Rationalizable Persuasion," Discussion Papers 16/08, Department of Economics, University of York.
    3. Taneva, Ina A, 2015. "Information Design," SIRE Discussion Papers 2015-50, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    4. Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2013. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Working Papers 13-03, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    5. Troya-Martinez, Marta, 2016. "Vagueness and information-sharing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 301-320.
    6. Berthomé, Guy-El-Karim & Thomas, Alban, 2017. "A Context-based Procedure for Assessing Participatory Schemes in Environmental Planning," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 113-123.
    7. Ayça Özdoðan, 2016. "A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion," Bogazici Journal, Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, vol. 30(1), pages 1-21.
    8. Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "A simple model of project selection with strategic communication and uncertain motives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 14-42.
    9. Mikhail Drugov & Roberto Hernán-González & Praveen Kujal & Marta Troya Martinez, 2013. "Cheap Talk with Two Audiences: An Experiment," Working Papers 13-32, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    10. Heski Bar-Isaac & Joyee Deb, 2012. "Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters," Working Papers 12-08, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    11. Wang, Yun, 2013. "The result of world powers in WTO: A cheap-talk game under different communication protocols," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 192-207.
    12. Yun Wang, 2015. "Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Receivers," WISE Working Papers 2015-03-24, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
    13. Murali Agastya & Parimal Kanti Bag & Indranil Chakraborty, 2014. "Communication and authority with a partially informed expert," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(1), pages 176-197, March.
    14. Kfir Eliaz & Roberto Serrano, 2014. "Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners’ dilemma," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 245-267, May.
    15. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2011. "Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations," PSE Working Papers halshs-00652279, HAL.
    16. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2012. "The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2897-2922, October.
    17. Frédéric Koessler & David Martimort, 2012. "Optimal Delegation with Multi-dimensional Decisions," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754576, HAL.
    18. Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2017. "Learning and Equilibrium Refinements in Signalling Games," Papers 1709.01024, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2017.
    19. Galeotti, Andrea & Ghiglino, Christian & Squintani, Francesco, 2013. "Strategic information transmission networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1751-1769.
    20. Duran, Mihael, 2013. "Board directors' preferences: What are good aggregation rules?," University of Tuebingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance 57, University of Tuebingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences.
    21. Sivan Frenkel, 2015. "Repeated Interaction and Rating Inflation: A Model of Double Reputation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(1), pages 250-280, February.
    22. McGee, Andrew & Yang, Huanxing, 2013. "Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 181-191.
    23. Ertac, Seda & Koçkesen, Levent & Ozdemir, Duygu, 2016. "The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 24-45.
    24. Battaglini, Marco & Makarov, Uliana, 2010. "Cheap Talk with Multiple Audiences: an Experimental Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 8146, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    25. Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi, 2015. "An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 114-144.
    26. Heski Bar-Isaac Jr. & Joyee Deb Jr., 2014. "(Good and Bad) Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 293-325, November.
    27. Ina A Taneva, 2015. "Information Design," ESE Discussion Papers 256, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.

  7. Maria Goltsman & Johannes Horner & Gregory Pavlov & Francesco Squintani, 2007. "Arbitration, Mediation and Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers 1445, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Lim, Wooyoung, 2014. "Communication in bargaining over decision rights," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 159-179.
    2. Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2018. "Receiver’s dilemma," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 116-124.
    3. Kovác, Eugen & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2009. "Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1373-1395, July.
    4. Li Ming, 2010. "Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-24, April.

  8. Gregory Pavlov, 2006. "Optimal Mechanism for Selling Substitutes," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-014, Boston University - Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Gregory Pavlov, 2010. "Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20103, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
    2. Chawla, Shuchi & Malec, David & Sivan, Balasubramanian, 2015. "The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 297-317.

  9. Gregory Pavlov, 2006. "Colluding on Participation Decisions," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-030, Boston University - Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Counter Marginalization of Information Rents under Collusion," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-04-01-23-02-48-07, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 27 Jan 2008.
    2. Dequiedt, V., 2006. "Ratification and veto constraints in mechanism design," Working Papers 200606, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
    3. Celik, Gorkem, 2009. "Mechanism design with collusive supervision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 69-95, January.
    4. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjöström, 2009. "Contracting with Third Parties," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 75-100, February.
    5. Nicolas Gruyer, 2008. "Optimal Auctions when a seller is bound to sell to collusive bidders (new version of "using lotteries ...")," Economics Working Papers 06, LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school).
    6. Dequiedt, Vianney, 2007. "Efficient collusion in optimal auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 302-323, September.
    7. Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo, 2007. "Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions," MPRA Paper 6098, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Jansen, Jos & Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2008. "The organization of regulated production: Complementarities, correlation and collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 327-353, January.

Articles

  1. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2014. "Communication in Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 152-176.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Neeman, Zvika & Pavlov, Gregory, 2013. "Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 473-501.

    Cited by:

    1. Alessandro Cigno & Mizuki Komura & Annalisa Luporini, 2016. "Self-Enforcing Family Rules, Marriage and the (non)Neutrality of Public Intervention," Working Papers - Economics wp2016_04.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    2. Kei Kawakami, 2013. "Maximally Informative Decision Rules In a Two-Person Decision Problem," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1178, The University of Melbourne, revised 2014.
    3. Mostafa Beshkar, 2014. "Arbitration and Renegotiation in Trade Agreements," Caepr Working Papers 2014-004, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
    4. Archishman Chakraborty & Alessandro Citanna & Michael Ostrovsky, 2015. "Group stability in matching with interdependent values," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(1), pages 3-24, March.
    5. Gretschko, Vitali & Wambach, Achim, 2017. "Contract (re-)negotiation with private and common values," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-056, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    6. Evans, Robert & Reiche, Sönje, 2015. "Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1159-1187.
    7. Robert Evans & Sonje Reiche, 2013. "Mechanism Design and Non-Cooperative Renegotiation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1331, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.

  3. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2011. "How to talk to multiple audiences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 100-122, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Pavlov Gregory, 2011. "Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-35, February.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Pavlov Gregory, 2011. "A Property of Solutions to Linear Monopoly Problems," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-18, February.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Goltsman, Maria & Hörner, Johannes & Pavlov, Gregory & Squintani, Francesco, 2009. "Mediation, arbitration and negotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1397-1420, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Kos, Nenad & Messner, Matthias, 2013. "Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 12-14.
    2. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
    3. Liang, Pinghan, 2013. "Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary," MPRA Paper 45271, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Deffains, Bruno & Demougin, Dominique & Desrieux, Claudine, 2017. "Choosing ADR or litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 33-40.
    5. Silvia Dominguez Martinez & Randolph Sloof, 2016. "Communication versus (Restricted) Delegation: An Experimental Comparison," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 16-050/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    6. Ying Chen & Sidartha Gordon, 2015. "Information transmission in nested sender–receiver games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(3), pages 543-569, April.
    7. Johannes Horner & Massimo Morelli & Francesco Squintani, 2015. "Mediation and Peace," Working Papers 541, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    8. Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2013. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Working Papers 13-03, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    9. Nicolas Jacquemet & Frédéric Koessler, 2011. "Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00565157, HAL.
    10. Deimen, Inga & Szalay, Dezso, 2015. "Information, authority, and smooth communication in organizations," CEPR Discussion Papers 10969, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Péter Vida & Francoise Forges, 2011. "Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: The Two-Player Case," CESifo Working Paper Series 3360, CESifo Group Munich.
    12. Lai, Ernest K., 2014. "Expert advice for amateurs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 1-16.
    13. Sher, Itai, 2014. "Persuasion and dynamic communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
    14. Krähmer, Daniel & Kováč, Eugen, 2016. "Optimal sequential delegation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 849-888.
    15. Blume, Andreas, 2012. "A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender–receiver games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 510-517.
    16. Mechtenberg, Lydia & Münster, Johannes, 2012. "A strategic mediator who is biased in the same direction as the expert can improve information transmission," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 490-492.
    17. Igor Letina & Shuo Liu & Nick Netzer, 2017. "Delegating performance evaluation," ECON - Working Papers 266, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Mar 2018.
    18. Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2012. "Communication in Cournot Oligopoly," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20121, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
    19. Omar A. Nayeem, 2017. "Bend Them but Don't Break Them: Passionate Workers, Skeptical Managers, and Decision Making in Organizations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 100-125, August.
    20. Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2013. "Exit Options and the Allocation of Authority," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 401, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    21. Alexander Frug, 2016. "Strategic Gradual Learning and Information Transmission," Working Papers 937, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    22. Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "A simple model of project selection with strategic communication and uncertain motives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 14-42.
    23. Ivanov, Maxim, 2014. "Beneficial mediated communication in cheap talk," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 129-135.
    24. Iaryczower, Matias & Oliveros, Santiago, 2016. "Power brokers: Middlemen in legislative bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 209-236.
    25. Kohei Kawamura, 2015. "Confidence and competence in communication," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 78(2), pages 233-259, February.
    26. Kohei, Kawamura, 2013. "Confidence and Competence in Communication," SIRE Discussion Papers 2013-43, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    27. Alonso, Ricardo & Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "The art of brevity," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58681, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    28. Hao Li & Xianwen Shi, 2013. "Discriminatory Information Disclosure," Working Papers tecipa-497, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    29. Johanna Hertel & John Smith, 2013. "Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(2), pages 267-291, August.
    30. Ambrus, Attila & Lu, Shih En, 2014. "Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 174-189.
    31. Martin Pollrich, 2017. "Mediated audits," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 48(1), pages 44-68, March.
    32. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2011. "How to talk to multiple audiences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 100-122, May.
    33. Frédéric Koessler & David Martimort, 2012. "Optimal Delegation with Multi-dimensional Decisions," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754576, HAL.
    34. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2010. "Decision Rules for Experts with Opposing Interests," Working Papers 674, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    35. Kolotilin, Anton & Li, Hao & Li, Wei, 2013. "Optimal limited authority for principal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2344-2382.
    36. Doornik, Katherine, 2014. "A rationale for mediation and its optimal use," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 1-10.
    37. Deimen, Inga & Szalay, Dezsö, 2014. "A Smooth, strategic communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 479, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    38. Frug, Alexander, 2016. "A note on optimal cheap talk equilibria in a discrete state space," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 180-185.
    39. Simona Fabrizi & Steffen Lippert, 2012. "Due Diligence, Research Joint Ventures, and Incentives to Innovate," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 168(4), pages 588-611, December.
    40. Alexander Frug, 2016. "Strategic gradual learning and information transmission," Economics Working Papers 1544, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    41. Li, Zhuozheng & Rantakari, Heikki & Yang, Huanxing, 2016. "Competitive cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 65-89.
    42. Vincent Anesi & Daniel J. Seidmann, 2009. "Optimal Delegation with a Finite Number of States," Discussion Papers 2009-20, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    43. Salvatore Piccolo & Giovanni W. Puopolo & Luis Vasconcelos, 2013. "Non-Exclusive Financial Advice," CSEF Working Papers 347, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 13 Oct 2015.
    44. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Informational control and organizational design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 721-751, March.
    45. Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2009. "Bayesian Persuasion," NBER Working Papers 15540, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    46. Hitoshi Sadakane, 2017. "Multistage Information Transmission with Voluntary Monetary Transfer," ISER Discussion Paper 1006, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    47. Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka & In-Uck Park, 2017. "Coordination of Humanitarian Aid," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 17/691, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    48. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2009. "Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game," Discussion Papers 05-08r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    49. Diehl, Christoph & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2016. "The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state-independent," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 489, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    50. Eisenkopf, Gerald, 2016. "Communication and Conflict Management," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145634, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    51. Maxim Ivanov, 2016. "Dynamic learning and strategic communication," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(3), pages 627-653, August.
    52. Gabriele Gratton, 2013. "The Sound of Silence: Anti-Defamation Law and Political Corruption," Discussion Papers 2012-21A, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    53. Gerald Eisenkopf, 2015. "Communication and conflict management," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2015-21, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
    54. Pinghan Liang, 2017. "Transfer of authority within hierarchies," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(4), pages 273-290, December.
    55. Kohei Kawamura, 2013. "Confidence and Competence in Communication," ESE Discussion Papers 222, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    56. Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi, 2015. "An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 114-144.
    57. Pinghan Liang, 2010. "Transfer of Authority within Hierarchy," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000139, David K. Levine.
    58. Andreas Blume & Oliver Board & Kohei Kawamura, 2007. "Noisy Talk," ESE Discussion Papers 167, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    59. Gratton, Gabriele, 2015. "The sound of silence: Political accountability and libel law," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 266-279.
    60. Lim, Wooyoung, 2012. "Selling authority," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 393-415.
    61. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Communication via a strategic mediator," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 869-884, March.
    62. Edoardo Grillo, 2013. "Reference Dependence, Risky Projects and Credible Information Transmission," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 331, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    63. Ambrus, Attila & Azevedo, Eduardo M. & Kamada, Yuichiro & Takagi, Yuki, 2013. "Legislative committees as information intermediaries: A unified theory of committee selection and amendment rules," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 103-115.
    64. Szalay, Dezsö, 2012. "Strategic information transmission and stochastic orders," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 386, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

  7. Pavlov, Gregory, 2008. "Auction design in the presence of collusion," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(3), September.

    Cited by:

    1. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp662, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    2. Sylvain Chassang & Juan Ortner, 2017. "Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement," Working Papers 072_2015, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    3. Gorkem Celik, 2015. "Implementation by Gradual Revelation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 271-296, June.
    4. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    5. Dawen Meng & Guoqiang Tian & Zhe Yang, 2017. "Two-agent collusion-proof implementation with correlation and arbitrage," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(3), pages 177-229, September.
    6. Xiaogang Che & Tilman Klumpp, 2016. "Entry Deterrence in Dynamic Second-Price Auctions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 168-201, May.
    7. Asseyer, Andreas, 2016. "Optimal Information Disclosure and Collusion," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145779, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2015. "Bribing in second-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 191-205.
    9. Meng, Dawen & Tian, Guoqiang, 2014. "Collusion-Proof Mechanism Design in Two-Agent Nonlinear Pricing Environments," MPRA Paper 57931, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Marquez, Robert & Singh, Rajdeep, 2013. "The economics of club bidding and value creation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 493-505.
    11. Troyan, Peter, 2017. "Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 319-345.
    12. Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo, 2007. "Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions," MPRA Paper 6098, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Olga Gorelkina, 2014. "Bidder Collusion and the Auction with Target Bids," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_10, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    14. M. Bumin Yenmez, 2013. "Incentive-Compatible Matching Mechanisms: Consistency with Various Stability Notions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 120-141, November.
    15. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 8 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (4) 2008-10-28 2010-03-13 2012-11-03 2013-09-06
  2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (4) 2010-03-13 2010-03-13 2012-11-03 2013-09-06
  3. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (2) 2012-11-03 2013-09-06
  4. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (2) 2012-11-03 2013-09-06
  5. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (2) 2010-03-13 2012-11-03
  6. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2012-11-03 2013-09-06
  7. NEP-CBE: Cognitive & Behavioural Economics (1) 2008-10-28
  8. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2010-03-13
  9. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2013-09-06
  10. NEP-HPE: History & Philosophy of Economics (1) 2013-09-06

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