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Colluding on Participation Decisions

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  • Gregory Pavlov

    () (Boston University, Department of Economics)

Abstract

We study the principal’s optimal response to collusion in an adverse selection environment. Building on the framework of Laffont and Martimort (1997, 2000) we advance it into several directions. First, unlike most of the literature, we study a stronger collusion when the agents can coordinate their participation decisions in addition to the joint play of the mechanism. Second, we make precise the economic nature of the transaction costs due to the presence of the asymmetric information in the collusive problem. Finally, while most of the literature focused on the two-type distributions, in our model the private information is distributed continuously. We characterize the set of implementable collusion-proof outcomes of the game, and relate it to the interim incentive-efficiency, which is a standard concept of efficiency under asymmetric information. After that we solve the principal’s problem by optimizing over a restricted set of mechanisms, which turn out to be optimal in a class of cases and allow the principal to fight collusion off at no cost.

Suggested Citation

  • Gregory Pavlov, 2006. "Colluding on Participation Decisions," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-030, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2006-030
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dequiedt, Vianney, 2007. "Efficient collusion in optimal auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 302-323, September.
    2. Nicolas Gruyer, 2008. "Optimal Auctions when a seller is bound to sell to collusive bidders (new version of "using lotteries ...")," Economics Working Papers 06, LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school).
    3. Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Counter Marginalization of Information Rents under Collusion," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-04-01-23-02-48-07, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 27 Jan 2008.
    4. Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo, 2009. "Optimal collusion-proof auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 565-603, March.
    5. Jansen, Jos & Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2008. "The organization of regulated production: Complementarities, correlation and collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 327-353, January.
    6. Celik, Gorkem, 2009. "Mechanism design with collusive supervision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 69-95.
    7. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjöström, 2009. "Contracting with Third Parties," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 75-100, February.
    8. Dequiedt, V., 2006. "Ratification and veto constraints in mechanism design," Working Papers 200606, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Collusion; Mechanism design; Auctions;

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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