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Counter Marginalization of Information Rents under Collusion

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  • Celik, Gorkem

Abstract

I study a multi-player mechanism design problem where the players are able to collude. I characterize the extent that the principal can link the compensation level of one of these players to the production performance of the other. I use this characterization result to identify the optimal contract for a principal with budget constraints.

Suggested Citation

  • Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Counter Marginalization of Information Rents under Collusion," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-04-01-23-02-48-07, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 27 Jan 2008.
  • Handle: RePEc:ubc:pmicro:celik-04-01-23-02-48-07
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    File URL: http://microeconomics.ca/gorkem_celik/count0712.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Collusion; Mechanism design;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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