Nonlinear Pricing with Arbitrage: On the Role of Correlation
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More about this item
KeywordsNonlinear pricing; weakly collusion-proof; arbitrage; correlated types;
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
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