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Auswirkungen vertikaler Kollusionsprobleme auf die vertragliche Ausgestaltung von Kreditverkäufen

  • Scholz, Julia
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    Die Arbeit untersucht die vertragliche Ausgestaltung von Kreditverkäufen, wenn zwischen dem Kreditverkäufer (Bank) und dem Kreditnehmer die Möglichkeit der Bildung einer zu Lasten des Kreditkäufers gehenden vertikalen Kollusion besteht. Die Bank übernimmt nach der Veräußerung des Kredits aufgrund eines Moral Hazard Problems auf der Seite des Kredit-nehmers das Monitoring und Servicing des Kredits, da der Investor über keine Kontrollmög-lichkeit des Kreditnehmers verfügt. Das Monitoring der Bank ist für den Käufer des Kredits nicht beobachtbar und überprüfbar, so dass sich die Möglichkeit einer vertikalen Absprache zwischen der Bank und dem Kreditnehmer ergibt. Es zeigt sich, dass die Möglichkeit zur Kol-lusion einen maßgeblichen Einfluss auf die optimale vertragliche Ausgestaltung des Kredit-verkaufs hat. Zur Maximierung ihres Verkaufserlöses muss die Bank einen Anteil des Kredits zurückbehalten, der jedoch höher ist als im Vergleich zum Fall, in welchem Kollusionen ex ante ausgeschlossen sind. Dies wird darauf zurückgeführt, dass die Bank nicht nur einen Teil des Kredits zurückbehalten muss, um dem Käufer des Kredits die Durchführung des Monito-ring zu signalisieren, sondern auch um diesem glaubhaft zu vermitteln, dass sie keine ineffi-ziente Absprache mit dem Kreditnehmer treffen wird. Dabei zeigt sich, dass dieser Effekt umso größer ist, je stärker sich die Moral Hazard Problematik auf Seiten des Unternehmers gestaltet.

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    Paper provided by University of Munich, Munich School of Management in its series Discussion Papers in Business Administration with number 4581.

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    Date of creation: Jun 2008
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    Handle: RePEc:lmu:msmdpa:4581
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