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Bargaining and Collusion in a Regulatory Model

  • Raffaele Fiocco
  • Mario Gilli

    ()

We consider the regulation of a monopolistic market when the prin- cipal delegates to a regulatory agency two tasks: the supervision of the firm's unknown costs and the arrangement of a pricing mechanism. As usual, the agency may have an incentive to hide information from the principal to share the informative rent with the firm. The novelty of this paper is that both the regulatory mechanism and the side con- tracting between the agency and the firm are modelled as a bargaining process. This negotiation between the regulator and the monopoly induces a radical change in the extraprofit from private information, which is now equal to the standard informational rent weighted by the agency’ bargaining power. This in turn a¤ects the collusive stage, in particular the firm has the greatest incentive to collude when fac- ing an agency with the same bargaining power. Then, we focus on the optimal organizational responses to the possibility of collusion. In our setting, where incompleteness of contracts prevents the design of a screening mechanism between the agency’ types and thus Tirole’ equivalence principle does not apply, we prove that the stronger the agency in the negotiation process, the greater the incentives for the principal to tolerate collusion in equilibrium.

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File URL: http://dipeco.economia.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper207.pdf
File Function: First version, 2011
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Paper provided by University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 207.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2011
Date of revision: Mar 2011
Handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:207
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