Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion
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- Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 2002. "Risk averse supervisors and the efficiency of collusion," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- David Martimort & Stephane Straub, 2006. "Privatization and Changes in Corruption Patterns: The Roots of Public Discontent," ESE Discussion Papers 147, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Hiriart, Yolande & Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jerome, 2010.
"The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 94(11-12), pages 1008-1019, December.
- Yolande Hiriart & David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet, 2009. "The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors," PSE Working Papers halshs-00566863, HAL.
- Yolande Hiriart & David Martimort & Jerome Pouyet, 2010. "The Public Management of Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors," Working Papers 2010.144, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Yolande Hiriart & David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet, 2010. "The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors," Post-Print halshs-00754410, HAL.
- Martimort, David & Straub, Stéphane, 2009. "Infrastructure privatization and changes in corruption patterns: The roots of public discontent," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 69-84, September.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Troy J. Scott, 2015.
"Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
RAND Corporation, vol. 46(4), pages 872-890, October.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree & Troy J Scott, 2011. "Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information," Working Papers UWEC-2011-08, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Troy J. Scott, 2013. "Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 4497, CESifo Group Munich.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques LawarrÃ©e & Sungho Yun, 2007.
"Bribery vs. Extortion: Allowing the Lesser of two Evils,"
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1993, CESifo Group Munich.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree & Sungho Yun, 2009. "Bribery vs. extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils," Working Papers UWEC-2007-11-P, University of Washington, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2009.
- Barlo, Mehmet & Ayca, Ozdogan, 2012. "Team beats collusion," MPRA Paper 37449, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- De Chiara, Alessandro & Livio, Luca, 2017.
"The threat of corruption and the optimal supervisory task,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 172-186.
- Alessandro De Chiara & Luca Livio, 2015. "The Threat of Corruption and the Optimal Supervisory Task," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2015-37, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Hiriart, Yolande & Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2005. "The Public Management of Environmental Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors," CEPR Discussion Papers 4992, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Scholz, Julia, 2008. "Auswirkungen vertikaler Kollusionsprobleme auf die vertragliche Ausgestaltung von Kreditverkäufen," Discussion Papers in Business Administration 4581, University of Munich, Munich School of Management.
More about this item
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
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