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The Public Management of Environmental Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors

Author

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  • Hiriart, Yolande
  • Martimort, David
  • Pouyet, Jérôme

Abstract

When firms undertake activities which are environmentally risky, the divergence between social and private incentives to exert safety care requires public intervention. This control occurs both through ex ante regulation and ex post legal investigation. We delineate the respective scopes of those two kinds of monitoring when regulators and judges may not be benevolent. Separation between the ex ante and the ex post monitors of the firm helps to prevent capture. The likelihood of both ex ante and ex post inspections is higher under separation than under integration. This provides a rationale for the widespread institutional trend that has led to the separation of ex ante regulation from ex post prosecution. The robustness of this result is investigated in various extensions. Only when collusion is self-enforcing might it be possible that integration dominates separation.

Suggested Citation

  • Hiriart, Yolande & Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2005. "The Public Management of Environmental Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors," CEPR Discussion Papers 4992, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4992
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Vera Angelova & Olivier Armantier & Giuseppe Attanasi & Yolande Hiriart, 2014. "Relative performance of liability rules: experimental evidence," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(4), pages 531-556, December.
    2. Yolande Hiriart & David Martimort, 2006. "The benefits of extended liability," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 562-582, September.
    3. Yolande Hiriart & David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet, 2008. "The Regulator and the Judge : The Optimal Mix in The Control of Environmental Risk," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 118(6), pages 941-967.
    4. Pedro Herrera & Oscar Millones, 2011. "¿Cuál Es El Costo De La Contaminación Ambiental Minera Sobre Los Recursos Hídricos En El Perú?," Documentos de Trabajo / Working Papers 2011-321, Departamento de Economía - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    environmental risk; exante and ex post investigations; integration and separation; liability; regulation;

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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