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Global Environmental Commons: Analytical and Political Challenges in Building Governance Mechanisms

  • Brousseau, Eric
    (Professor of Economics and Management; University Paris-Dauphine and European University Institute)

  • Dedeurwaerdere, Tom
    (Professor, Universite Catholique de Louvain)

  • Jouvet, Pierre-Andre
    (Full Professor, Universite de Paris Ouest -Nanterre)

  • Willinger, Marc
    (Professor, Universite de Montpellier 1 and Institut Universitaire de France)

Registered editor(s):

Environmental challenges, and the potential solutions to address them, have a direct effect on living standards, the organization of economies, major infrastructures, and modes of urbanization. Since the publication of path-breaking contributions on the governance of environmental resources in the early 1990s, many political initiatives have been taken, numerous governance experiments have been conducted, and a large multi-disciplinary field of research has opened up. This interdisciplinary book takes stock of the knowledge that has accumulated to date, and addresses new challenges in the provision of environmental goods. It focuses on three essential dimensions with respect to governance. First, it addresses the issue of designing governance solutions through analyzing systems of rules, and levels of organization, in the governance and management of environmental issues. Second, it draws renewed attention to the negotiation processes among stakeholders playing a crucial role in reaching agreements over issues and solutions, and in choosing and implementing particular policy instruments. Finally, it shows that compliance depends on a combination of formal rules, enforced by recognized authorities, and informal obligations, such as social and individual norms. The evolution of the research frontiers on environmental governance shows that more legitimate and informed processes of collective decision, and more subtle and effective ways of managing compliance, can contribute to more effective policy. However, this book also illustrates that more democratic and effective governance should rely on more direct and pluralistic forms of involvement of citizens and stakeholders in the collective decision making processes Contributors to this volume - Thierry Brechet, Universite Catholique de Louvain, Belgium Eric Brousseau, Paris-Dauphine University and the European University Institute, Florence, Italy Graciela Chichilnisky, Columbia University, New York, USA Tom Dedeurwaerdere, Universite Catholique de Louvain, Belgium Denny Ellerman, European University Institute, Florence, Italy Johan Eyckmans, Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel (HUB), Belgium Michael Faure, Maastricht University, The Netherlands Rupert Gatti, Trinity College, University of Cambridge, UK Timo Goeschl, University of Heidelberg, Germany Ben Groom, SOAS, University of London, UK Hiroe Ishihara, University of Cambridge, UK Pierre-Andre Jouvet, Universite de Paris Ouest- Nanterre, France Gary Libecap, University of California, Santa Barbara, USA Paulo A. L. D. Nunes, Universite Catholique de Louvain, Belgium Laura Onofri, University of Venice, Ca'Foscari, Italy Elinor Ostrom, Indiana University, Bloomington, USA Unai Pascual, University of Cambridge, UK Charles Perrings, Arizona State University, USA Andries Richter, Wageningen University, The Netherlands Daan Van Soest, Tilburg University, The Netherlands Timothy Swanson, University College London, UK Arild Vatn, Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB), Norway Marc Willinger, University of Montpellier I, France Oran Young, University of California, Santa Barbara, USA

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This book is provided by Oxford University Press in its series OUP Catalogue with number 9780199656202 and published in 2012.
ISBN: 9780199656202
Handle: RePEc:oxp:obooks:9780199656202
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  1. Kolstad, Charles D & Ulen, Thomas S & Johnson, Gary V, 1990. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 888-901, September.
  2. Hahn, Robert W., 1989. "A new approach to the design of regulation in the presence of multiple objectives," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 195-211, September.
  3. Skogh, Goran, 1982. "Public insurance and accident prevention," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 67-80, June.
  4. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," MPRA Paper 12536, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Stavins, Robert, 2000. "Experience with Market-Based Environmental Policy Instruments," Working Paper Series rwp00-004, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  6. Coelho, Philip R P, 1976. "Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Control versus Taxes: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(5), pages 976-78, December.
  7. George J. Stigler, 1961. "The Economics of Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 69, pages 213.
  8. Donald N Dewees, 1992. "The Comparative Efficacy of Tort Law and Regulation for Environmental Protection*," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 17(4), pages 446-467, October.
  9. Burrows, Paul, 1999. "Combining regulation and legal liability for the control of external costs," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 227-244, June.
  10. A. Meltzer & Peter Ordeshook & Thomas Romer, 1983. "Introduction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 1-5, January.
  11. Buchanan, James M & Tullock, Gordon, 1975. "Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 139-47, March.
  12. Schulze, William & d'Arge, Ralph C, 1974. "The Coase Proposition, Information Constraints, and Long-Run Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(4), pages 763-72, September.
  13. A. P. Thirlwall, 1983. "Introduction," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 5(3), pages 341-344, April.
  14. Mishan, E J, 1971. "The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretative Essay," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 1-28, March.
  15. Kapp, K William, 1970. "Environmental Disruption and Social Costs: A Challenge to Economics," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(4), pages 833-48.
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