On the joint use of licensing and liability
Licensing is a widely used technique applied to impose regulations. Firms inducing harm must hold a license issued by a regulatory agency on a case-by-case basis. A firm may also be subject to liability. This paper studies the implications on social welfare of combining licensing with strict liability. Contributions include the study of a joint use and related administrative costs. The latter include costs pertaining to litigation and the issuing and enforcing of licenses. It is established when a joint use is motivated. Regulatory compliance should protect from liability in order to decrease litigation and enforcement costs and associated distortions.
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