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Combining regulation and legal liability for the control of external costs

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  • Burrows, Paul

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  • Burrows, Paul, 1999. "Combining regulation and legal liability for the control of external costs," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 227-244, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:19:y:1999:i:2:p:227-244
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Burrows, Paul, 1986. "Nonconvexity induced by external costs on production: Theoretical curio or policy dilemma?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 101-128, June.
    2. Spulber, Daniel F., 1985. "Effluent regulation and long-run optimality," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 103-116, June.
    3. Cooter, Robert D., 1980. "How the law circumvents Starrett's nonconvexity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 499-504, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Brousseau, Eric & Dedeurwaerdere, Tom & Jouvet, Pierre-Andre & Willinger, Marc (ed.), 2012. "Global Environmental Commons: Analytical and Political Challenges in Building Governance Mechanisms," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199656202.
    2. BOYER, Marcel & PORRINI, Donatella, 2010. "Optimal Liability Sharing and Court Errors : An Exploratory Analysis," Cahiers de recherche 05-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    3. Pierre Bentata, 2014. "Liability as a complement to environmental regulation: an empirical study of the French legal system," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 16(3), pages 201-228, July.
    4. Dieter Schmidtchen & Christian Koboldt & Jenny Monheim & Birgit Will & Georg Haas, "undated". "The Internalisation of External Costs in Transport: From the Polluter Pays to the Cheapest Cost Avoider Principle," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2008-1-1214, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    5. Marion Desquilbet & Sylvaine Poret, 2014. "How do GM/non GM coexistence regulations affect markets and welfare?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 51-82, February.
    6. Calcott Paul, 2016. "Regulations to Supplement Weak Environmental Liability," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(4), pages 1-14, October.
    7. Nuno Garoupa, 2004. "Punish Once or Punish Twice: A Theory of the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Addition to Regulatory Penalties," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 410-433.
    8. Friehe, Tim & Langlais, Eric, 2015. "On the political economy of public safety investments," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 7-16.
    9. Boyer, Marcel & Porrini, Donatella, 2011. "The impact of court errors on liability sharing and safety regulation for environmental/industrial accidents," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 21-29, March.
    10. Alfred Endres & Tim Friehe & Bianca Rundshagen, 2015. "Environmental liability law and R&D subsidies: results on the screening of firms and the use of uniform policy," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 17(4), pages 521-541, October.
    11. Lenntorp, Erik, 2009. "On the joint use of licensing and liability," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 244-251, September.
    12. Nuno Garoupa, 2009. "Least-Cost Avoidance: The Tragedy of Common Safety," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 235-261, May.
    13. Zivin, Joshua Graff & Just, Richard E. & Zilberman, David, 2005. "Risk Aversion, Liability Rules, and Safety," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 604-623, December.
    14. Grajzl, Peter & Baniak, Andrzej, 2009. "Industry self-regulation, subversion of public institutions, and social control of torts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 360-374, December.
    15. Iljoong Kim, 2008. "Securities laws ‘facilitating’ private enforcement," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 17-38, February.
    16. Guiseppe Dari Mattiaci & F. Parisi, 2003. "The Economics of Tort Law: A Précis," Working Papers 03-13, Utrecht School of Economics.
    17. G.G.A. de Geest & G. Dari Mattiacci, 2005. "Soft Regulators, though judges," Working Papers 05-06, Utrecht School of Economics.
    18. Bhole, Bharat & Wagner, Jeffrey, 2008. "The joint use of regulation and strict liability with multidimensional care and uncertain conviction," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 123-132, June.
    19. Eef Delhaye, 2004. "Traffic safety: speed limits, strict liability and a km tax," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0407, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
    20. J.A. den Hertog, 2010. "Review of economic theories of regulation," Working Papers 10-18, Utrecht School of Economics.
    21. Calcott, Paul & Hutton, Stephen, 2006. "The choice of a liability regime when there is a regulatory gatekeeper," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 153-164, March.
    22. Andrzej Baniak & Peter Grajzl, 2014. "Controlling Product Risks when Consumers are Heterogeneously Overconfident: Producer Liability vs. Minimum Quality Standard Regulation," CESifo Working Paper Series 5003, CESifo Group Munich.

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