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How do GM / non GM coexistence regulations affect markets and welfare?

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  • Desquilbet, Marion
  • Poret, Sylvaine

Abstract

This paper presents a theoretical economic model assessing the effects of the level of mandatory genetically modified (GM) / non-GM coexistence regulations on market and welfare outcomes. We assume vertical differentiation of GM and non-GM goods on the consumer side. Producers are heterogeneous in their production cost for GM crops. Producers of non- GM crops face a probability of having their harvest downgraded if gene flow from GM fields raises its content in GMOs (genetically modified organisms) above the labeling threshold. The government may impose on GMO producers mandatory ex ante isolation distances from non- GM fields in order to decrease the probability of non-GM harvest downgrading. It may also introduce an ex post compensation to non-GMO farmers for profit losses due to harvest downgrading, imposing GMO farmers’ participation to a compensation fund via a tax on GM seeds. Assuming endogenous crop choices and prices, we study the effects of ex ante regulation and ex post liability of GMO producers on market equilibrium, on the achievement of coexistence, and on both global and interest group welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Desquilbet, Marion & Poret, Sylvaine, 2012. "How do GM / non GM coexistence regulations affect markets and welfare?," TSE Working Papers 12-350, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jun 2013.
  • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:26514
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Andrzej Baniak & Peter Grajzl, 2016. "Controlling Product Risks when Consumers Are Heterogeneously Overconfident: Producer Liability versus Minimum-Quality-Standard Regulation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(2), pages 274-304, June.
    2. GianCarlo Moschini, 2014. "In Medio Stat Virtus: Coexistence Policies for GM and non-GM Production in Spatial Equilibrium," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 14-wp548, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
    3. Andrzej Baniak & Peter Grajzl, 2014. "Controlling Product Risks when Consumers are Heterogeneously Overconfident: Producer Liability vs. Minimum Quality Standard Regulation," CESifo Working Paper Series 5003, CESifo Group Munich.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

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