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Introduction to the Political Economy of Environmental Regulations

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  • Stavins, Robert N.

Abstract

This paper introduces a volume of collected papers on the political economy of environmental regulation: economic analyses of the processes through which political decisions regarding environmental regulation are made, principally in the institutional context found in the United States. Despite this geographic focus, many of the papers contain analytical models that are methodologically of interest and/or have lessons that are relevant in other parts of the world. In the environmental realm, questions of political economy emerge along three fundamental dimensions, which are closely interrelated but conceptually distinct: (1) the degree of government activity; (2) the form of government activity; and (3) the level of government that has responsibility. The first three parts of the book deal respectively with these three fundamental dimensions of inquiry. Part I features a set of six articles that examine how the targets and goals of individual environmental policies are established. Part II brings together nine articles that employ the analytical apparatus of positive political economy to address questions related to the choice of policy instruments for environmental regulation. Part III features four articles that examine- both positively and normatively - the level of government that is delegated responsibility for environmental protection. Finally, in Part IV, three articles are featured that assess the use of economic analysis in contemporary environmental policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Stavins, Robert N., 2004. "Introduction to the Political Economy of Environmental Regulations," Discussion Papers 10876, Resources for the Future.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:rffdps:10876
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.10876
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    Cited by:

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    4. Stossel, Zeev & Kissinger, Meidad & Meir, Avinoam, 2015. "Measuring the biophysical dimension of urban sustainability," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 153-163.
    5. Dasgupta, Shouro & De Cian, Enrica, 2016. "Institutions and the Environment: Existing Evidence and Future Directions," MITP: Mitigation, Innovation and Transformation Pathways 240747, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    6. Stossel, Zeev & Kissinger, Meidad & Meir, Avinoam, 2017. "Modeling the Contribution of Existing and Potential Measures to Urban Sustainability Using the Urban Biophysical Sustainability Index (UBSI)," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 1-8.
    7. Ian A. Lange & Sarah Polborn, 2012. "Can Lobbying Encourage Abatement? Designing a New Policy Instrument," CESifo Working Paper Series 3760, CESifo.
    8. Martin, Paul V., 2018. "Managing the risks of ecosystem services markets," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 29(PB), pages 404-410.
    9. Robert N. Stavins, 2017. "The Evolution Of Environmental Economics: A View From The Inside," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 62(02), pages 251-274, June.
    10. MacKenzie, Ian A. & Ohndorf, Markus, 2012. "Cap-and-trade, taxes, and distributional conflict," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 51-65.
    11. Seok, Jo-Eun & Kim, Junki & Park, Hyo Seong, 2021. "Regulatory and social dynamics of voluntary agreement adoption: The case of voluntary energy efficiency and GHG reduction agreement in South Korea," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 148(PB).
    12. Lan, Jing & Munro, Alistair & Liu, Zhen, 2017. "Environmental regulatory stringency and the market for abatement goods and services in China," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 105-123.
    13. Shouro Dasgupta & Enrica De Cian & Elena Verdolini, 2016. "The Political Economy of Energy Innovation," Working Papers 2016.35, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    14. Lawrence Rothenberg, 2012. "The Political Economy of Climate Change," Chapters, in: Chin Hee Hahn & Sang-Hyop Lee & Kyoung-Soo Yoon (ed.), Responding to Climate Change, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.

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