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The determinants of Government environmental performance - an empirical analysis of Chinese townships

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Listed:
  • Hua Wang
  • Wenhua Di

Abstract

This paper explores the determinants of government environmental performance at the local level. Chinese township governments, the lowest level in the hierarchical government structure, were selected for this exercise. The performance indicators used in the analyses include the efforts of enforcing government environmental regulations and of providing environmental services to polluting enterprises. The performance determinants identified include environmental performance of upper-level governments, local development status, industrial employment, income of workers in polluting enterprises, local environmental quality, and public pressure for environmental quality improvement. A survey of 85 townships and interviews of 151 township government leaders were conducted in three provinces of China. The statistical results show that: a) The environmental performance of upper-level governments in China strongly and positively influences the environmental efforts of the township governments. b) Public pressure has created incentives for the township governments to improve their efforts in both enforcing environmental regulations and providing environmental services, while the environmental quality did not show significant impacts. c) Higher employment in industries tends to have a negative influence on the regulatory enforcement, but a positive influence on environmental service provision. d) A higher enforcement effort and a lower service provision are associated with higher wages the workers received from industries. This implies that the industries offering higher wages to the workers are subject to more stringent environmental enforcement but receive less environmental services. 5) Richer townships tend to have less regulatory enforcement but better environmental services.

Suggested Citation

  • Hua Wang & Wenhua Di, 2002. "The determinants of Government environmental performance - an empirical analysis of Chinese townships," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2937, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2937
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    2. Jin Guo & Junhong Bai, 2019. "The Role of Public Participation in Environmental Governance: Empirical Evidence from China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(17), pages 1-19, August.
    3. Jiang, Kangqi & Chen, Zhongfei & Chen, Fanglin, 2022. "Green creates value: Evidence from China," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    4. Ruperta Lichtenecker, 2006. "Umwelttechnikindustrie - Zukunftsmarkt China," Economics working papers 2006-01, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
    5. Yankun Zhou & Le Luo & Hongtao Shen, 2022. "Community pressure, regulatory pressure and corporate environmental performance," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 47(2), pages 368-392, May.
    6. Yu, Hongwei & Xu, Jiahui & Shen, Fang & Fang, Debin & Shi, Daqian, 2022. "The effects of an environmental accountability system on local environmental governance and firms’ emissions," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 46(3).
    7. Xiangyang Yang & Zheng Zhang & Siqi Rao & Bei Liu & Yueyue Li, 2022. "How Does Environmental Information Disclosure Affect Pollution Emissions: Firm-Level Evidence from China," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(19), pages 1-20, October.
    8. Ge Gao & Xiuting Li & Xiaoting Liu & Jichang Dong, 2021. "Does Air Pollution Impact Fiscal Sustainability? Evidence from Chinese Cities," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(21), pages 1-16, November.
    9. Mary-Françoise Renard & Hang Xiong, 2012. "Strategic Interactions in Environmental Regulation Enforcement: Evidence from Chinese Provinces," CERDI Working papers halshs-00672449, HAL.
    10. Marcella D?Uva, 2018. "Environmental Protection in Italian regions: North-Centre vs. South?," RIVISTA DI STUDI SULLA SOSTENIBILITA', FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2018(1), pages 25-34.
    11. Wang, Shanyong & Zhang, Rongwei & Wan, Liang & Chen, Jiusong, 2023. "Has Central Government Environmental Protection Interview Improved Air Quality in China?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).

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