Ownership And Industrial Pollution Control: Evidence From China
This study explores the differences in pollution control performances of industrial enterprises with various ownerships in China - State owned (SOE), collectively or community owned (COE), privately owned (POE), foreign directly invested (FDI) companies as well as joint ventures. A survey was conducted of approximately 1000 industrial firms in three provinces in China, which collects the detailed firm-level information in the year of 1999. Personal interviews of enterprises managers were also conducted in these samples, and subjective information was collected. Analyses have been performed on the differences in receiving and reacting to environmental regulatory enforcement, community pressure, environmental services, and internal environmental management among different ownerships. The determinants of the industrial pollution emissions in China are identified in the econometrical analyses. The results show that FDI and COE have better environmental performances, while SOEs and the POEs in China are the worst.
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