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Superfund expenditures and cleanup priorities: Distributive politics or the public interest?

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  • John A. Hird

Abstract

Using data on all final National Priorities List (NPL) sites, this study employs an integrated model of distributive and public interest politics to determine whether the overall pace of cleanup efforts and funding of the 8.5 billion Superfund program over the past eight years reflects self-interested congressional influence or public interest objectives. Despite the fact that both EPA and Congress have substantial incentives to promote the Superfund program, the results indicate that once a site is on the final NPL, there is little committee-based congressional influence over the distribution of site cleanup or funding, although evidence exists that legislators can hasten a site's transition from proposed to final status on the NPL. The chief determinants of cleanup pace and level of funding are the site's Hazard Ranking System (HRS) scores, whether federal funds are financing the cleanup, and whether the site is designated as a state priority.

Suggested Citation

  • John A. Hird, 1990. "Superfund expenditures and cleanup priorities: Distributive politics or the public interest?," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(4), pages 455-483.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:9:y:1990:i:4:p:455-483
    DOI: 10.2307/3325258
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Jessi Troyan & Joshua Hall, 2019. "The Political Economy of Abandoned Mine Land Fund Disbursements," Economies, MDPI, vol. 7(1), pages 1-17, January.
    3. Stavins, Robert, 2004. "Introduction to the Political Economy of Environmental Regulations," RFF Working Paper Series dp-04-12, Resources for the Future.
    4. Helland, Eric, 1998. "The Revealed Preferences of State EPAs: Stringency, Enforcement, and Substitution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 242-261, May.
    5. Pingo Wang & Alok Bohara & Robert Berrens & Kishore Gawande, 1998. "A risk-based environmental Kuznets curve for US hazardous waste sites," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(12), pages 761-763.
    6. Millimet, Daniel L., 2013. "Environmental Federalism: A Survey of the Empirical Literature," IZA Discussion Papers 7831, IZA Network @ LISER.
    7. Wallace E. Oates & Paul R. Portney & Wallace E. Oates & Paul R. Portney, 2004. "The Political Economy of Environmental Policy," Chapters, in: Environmental Policy and Fiscal Federalism, chapter 1, pages 3-30, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    8. Helland, Eric & Whitford, Andrew B., 2003. "Pollution incidence and political jurisdiction: evidence from the TRI," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 403-424, November.
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    12. Jeffrey Lazarus, 2010. "Giving the People What They Want? The Distribution of Earmarks in the U.S. House of Representatives," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(2), pages 338-353, April.
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    15. Gawande, Kishore & Berrens, Robert P. & Bohara, Alok K., 2001. "A consumption-based theory of the environmental Kuznets curve," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 101-112, April.

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