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Agenda control in an unstable multiparty parliamentary democracy: evidence from the Israeli public sector

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  • Maoz Rosenthal

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  • Maoz Rosenthal, 2012. "Agenda control in an unstable multiparty parliamentary democracy: evidence from the Israeli public sector," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 22-44, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:23:y:2012:i:1:p:22-44
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-011-9113-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Assaf Meydani, 2008. "Political entrepreneurs and electoral capital: the case of the Israeli State Economy Arrangement Law," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 301-312, December.
    2. McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 243-277, Fall.
    3. Weingast, Barry R & Moran, Mark J, 1983. "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(5), pages 765-800, October.
    4. Miller, Gary J. & Moe, Terry M., 1983. "Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(2), pages 297-322, June.
    5. Mueller,Dennis C. (ed.), 1997. "Perspectives on Public Choice," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521553773.
    6. Huber, John D., 1998. "How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(3), pages 577-591, September.
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