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Organizaciones burocráticas e ineficiencia X: Una revisión de modelos

  • Ana Rodríguez Alvarez

    ()

    (Universidad de Oviedo)

  • Javier Suárez-Pandiello

    ()

    (Universidad de Oviedo)

El presente trabajo es una revisión de los principales modelos microeconómicos que han analizado el problema de la ineficiencia X en organizaciones burocráticas. A partir del trabajo seminal de Niskanen, que parte del supuesto de que existe eficiencia productiva en las organizaciones burocráticas, analizamos posteriores trabajos que modifican los supuestos iniciales de Niskanen con el objetivo de explicar la existencia de ineficiencia X en las agencias burocráticas. La conclusión a la que llegamos es que en estas organizaciones pueden existir objetivos no coherentes con la idea de eficiencia productiva. Así, para cada modelo, analizamos las implicaciones que tal comportamiento tiene sobre la ineficiencia X. Classification-JEL : D21; D73; H32.

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File URL: http://www.ief.es/documentos/recursos/publicaciones/revistas/hac_pub/164_Ineficiencia.pdf
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Article provided by IEF in its journal Hacienda Pública Española/Revista de Economía Pública.

Volume (Year): 164 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (march)
Pages: 83-107

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Handle: RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2003:v:164:i:1:p:83-107
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  1. Harvey Leibenstein, 1975. "Aspects of the X-Efficiency Theory of the Firm," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(2), pages 580-606, Autumn.
  2. Tollison, Robert D, 1982. "Rent Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 575-602.
  3. Gary Miller, 1977. "Bureaucratic compliance as a game on the unit square," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 37-51, March.
  4. Moene, Karl O., 1986. "Types of bureaucratic interaction," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 333-345, April.
  5. McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 243-77, Fall.
  6. Niskanen, William A, 1975. "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 617-43, December.
  7. Button, Kenneth J & Weyman-Jones, Thomas G, 1992. "Ownership Structure, Institutional Organization and Measured X-Efficiency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 439-45, May.
  8. Leibenstein, Harvey & Maital, Shlomo, 1992. "Empirical Estimation and Partitioning of X-Inefficiency: A Data-Envelopment Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 428-33, May.
  9. Grosskopf Shawna & Hayes Kathy, 1993. "Local Public Sector Bureaucrats and Their Input Choices," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 151-166, March.
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