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Organizaciones burocráticas e ineficiencia X: Una revisión de modelos

Author

Listed:
  • Ana Rodríguez Alvarez

    (Universidad de Oviedo)

  • Javier Suárez-Pandiello

    (Universidad de Oviedo)

Abstract

El presente trabajo es una revisión de los principales modelos microeconómicos que han analizado el problema de la ineficiencia X en organizaciones burocráticas. A partir del trabajo seminal de Niskanen, que parte del supuesto de que existe eficiencia productiva en las organizaciones burocráticas, analizamos posteriores trabajos que modifican los supuestos iniciales de Niskanen con el objetivo de explicar la existencia de ineficiencia X en las agencias burocráticas. La conclusión a la que llegamos es que en estas organizaciones pueden existir objetivos no coherentes con la idea de eficiencia productiva. Así, para cada modelo, analizamos las implicaciones que tal comportamiento tiene sobre la ineficiencia X. Classification-JEL : D21; D73; H32.

Suggested Citation

  • Ana Rodríguez Alvarez & Javier Suárez-Pandiello, 2003. "Organizaciones burocráticas e ineficiencia X: Una revisión de modelos," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 164(1), pages 83-107, march.
    • Handle: RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2003:v:164:i:1:p:83-107
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Naturaleza de la ineficiencia; ineficiencia productiva; teoría de la burocracia.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm

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