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Business Subsidies and Bureaucratic Behaviour


  • Venetoklis, Takis


The study attempts to apply William Niskanen's (1971) theory of budget maximising bureaucrats to the business subsidies policy implemented in Finland, by one of the major distributor of subsidies to firms, the ministry of Trade and Industry (KTM). The empirical analysis is based on records of 15 300 firms applying for aid through the KTM regional offices during 1995-1999 and on the budgeted appropriations given to the KTM between 1989 and 2000. In testing Niskanen's theory we examine whether its four assumptions are relevant and applicable within the context of the KTM?s business subsidies policy. First, information asymmetry is found to exist between the KTM and its sponsor (the ministry of Finance VM). Second, bilateral monopoly is also evident between the two parties. Third, the VM does not seem to play a passive role during the budget negotiations with the KTM, as Niskanen assumed. The fourth assumption - the budget maximising bureaucrat - is tested by examining (a) the strategies of the KTM bureaucrats in attempting to maximise their bureau's budget and (b) the success in their budget maximisation efforts. Looking at the budget maximisation strategies, our analysis shows that the bureaucrats? request for funds is not based on the previous year's appropriations, as initially hypothesised. However, we find strong evidence suggesting that bureaucrats attempt to get rid of unallocated funds before year's end in order to avoid receiving less the following years. Finally, our logistic regression analysis indicates that bureaucrats pursue a "creaming" policy where only firms that have better chances of success, receive more subsidies. That way, they can reduce the chances of the policy not achieving its goals, thus avoid the risk of having later deductions in the program's budget. In testing the success of the bureaucrats? budget maximisation efforts, we note that, despite that subsidy appropriations have fluctuated during the examined period, administrative expenses (including salaries) have stayed flat or grown to some degree. Although this is not a causal finding, it suggests that bureaucrats have succeeded in - at least - safeguarding the appropriations which are of major importance to them. Among others, the study recommends that direct subsidies to firms should be reduced further, and be substituted by advanced advisory services, subsidised loans and forgivable loans.

Suggested Citation

  • Venetoklis, Takis, 2001. "Business Subsidies and Bureaucratic Behaviour," Research Reports 79, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:fer:resrep:79

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Thomas McGuire, 1981. "Budget-maximizing governmental agencies: An empirical test," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 313-322, January.
    2. repec:cup:apsrev:v:77:y:1983:i:02:p:297-322_24 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Roper, Stephen & Hewitt-Dundas, Nola, 2001. "Grant Assistance and Small Firm Development in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 48(1), pages 99-117, February.
    4. P. J. A. Robson & R. J. Bennett, 2000. "The use and impact of business advice by SMEs in Britain: an empirical assessment using logit and ordered logit models," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(13), pages 1675-1688.
    5. Bhagwati, Jagdish N, 1982. "Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 988-1002, October.
    6. William G. Gale, 1990. "Collateral, Rationing, and Government Intervention in Credit Markets," NBER Chapters,in: Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment, pages 43-62 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Niskanen, William A, 1975. "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 617-643, December.
    8. Tollison, Robert D, 1982. "Rent Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 575-602.
    9. Venetoklis, Takis, 1999. "Process Evaluation of Business Subsidies in Finland. A Quantitative Approach," Research Reports 58, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
    10. Benedict J. Clements & Hugo Rodríguez & Gerd Schwartz, 1998. "Economic Determinants of Government Subsidies," IMF Working Papers 98/166, International Monetary Fund.
    11. Gerd Schwartz & Réjane Hugounenq & Benedict J. Clements, 1995. "Government Subsidies; Concepts, International Trends, and Reform Options," IMF Working Papers 95/91, International Monetary Fund.
    12. Otto Davis & M. Dempster & Aaron Wildavsky, 1966. "On the process of budgeting: An empirical study of congressional appropriation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 63-132, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Luoma, Kalevi & Räty, Tarmo & Mäkinen, Erkki & Vaarama, Marja, 2003. "The Factors Affecting the Use of Elderly Care and the Need for Resources by 2030 in Finland," Research Reports 99, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
    2. Venetoklis, Takis, 2002. "Public Policy Evaluation: Introduction to Quantitative Methodologies," Research Reports 90, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
    3. Aki Kangasharju, 2007. "Do Wage Subsidies Increase Employment in Subsidized Firms?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(293), pages 51-67, February.
    4. Järviö, Maija-Liisa & Luoma, Kalevi & Räty, Tarmo & Aaltonen, Juho, 2005. "Productivity and its Drivers in Finnish Primary Care 1988-2003," Research Reports 118, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
    5. Ruotoistenmäki, Riikka & Babykina, Evgenia, 2002. "The Actors and the Financial Affairs of the Northern Dimension," Research Reports 86, VATT Institute for Economic Research.


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