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Collateral, Rationing, and Government Intervention in Credit Markets

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  • William G. Gale

    (UCLA)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effects of government intervention in credit markets when lenders use collateral, interest, and the probability of granting a loan as potential screening devices. Equilibria with and without rationing are examined. The principal theme is that credit policies operate through their effect on the incentive compatibility constraint, which inhibits high-risk borrowers from mimicking the behavior of low-risk borrowers. Any policy that loosens (tightens) the constraint raises (reduces) efficiency. Most government credit programs explicitly attempt to fund investors that cannot obtain private financing. In the model presented here, these subsidies increase the extent of rationing and reduce efficiency. In contrast, policies that subsidize the nonrationed borrowers, or all borrowers, are efficiency enhancing, and reduce the extent of rationing.
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Suggested Citation

  • William G. Gale, 1989. "Collateral, Rationing, and Government Intervention in Credit Markets," UCLA Economics Working Papers 554, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:554
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    Cited by:

    1. Anginer, Deniz & de la Torre, Augusto & Ize, Alain, 2014. "Risk-bearing by the state: When is it good public policy?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 10(C), pages 76-86.
    2. Schmieding, Holger, 1991. "Transforming the financial system in Eastern Europe's market economies: A proposal for clean balance sheets and an institutional transfer," Kiel Working Papers 497, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    3. Corinne Le Gallic, 1995. "Déréglementation financière, cycle et croissance," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(2), pages 255-281.
    4. David de Meza, 2002. "Overlending?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(477), pages 17-31, February.
    5. Busetta, Giovanni & Zazzaro, Alberto, 2012. "Mutual loan-guarantee societies in monopolistic credit markets with adverse selection," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 15-24.
    6. Karel Janda, 2011. "Credit Rationing and Public Support of Commercial Credit," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp436, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    7. Riccardo De Bonis & Matteo Piazza & Roberto Tedeschi, 2012. "The perverse effect of government credit subsidies on banking risk," Mo.Fi.R. Working Papers 68, Money and Finance Research group (Mo.Fi.R.) - Univ. Politecnica Marche - Dept. Economic and Social Sciences.
    8. Patrick Artus, 1993. "Crises financières et cycle réel : Le rôle des imperfections du marché du crédit," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 26(3), pages 89-107.
    9. Karel Janda, 2011. "Credit Guarantees and Subsidies when Lender has a Market Power," Working Papers IES 2011/18, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jun 2011.
    10. Rajalaxmi Kamath, 2006. "Public inputs and the credit market," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 13(6), pages 733-753, November.
    11. repec:isu:genstf:1996010108000012129 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Hoff, Karla & Lyon, Andrew B., 1995. "Non-leaky buckets: Optimal redistributive taxation and agency costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 365-390, November.
    13. Winker, Peter, 1994. "Credit rationing at the firm level: Some microeconometric evidence," Discussion Papers, Series II 223, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    14. Karel Janda, 2003. "Credit guarantees in a credit market with adverse selection," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2003(4), pages 331-349.
    15. Ma, Chien-Hui & Smith, Bruce D., 1996. "Credit market imperfections and economic development: Theory and evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 351-387, March.
    16. Dailami, Mansoor & Kim, E. Han, 1991. "The effects of debt subsidies on corporate investment behavior," Policy Research Working Paper Series 727, The World Bank.
    17. Patrick Artus, 1992. "Taux d'intérêt réels élevés et financement de l'économie," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 43(4), pages 671-684.
    18. Iichiro Uesugi & Koji Sakai & Guy M. Yamashiro, 2006. "Effectiveness of Credit Guarantees in the Japanese Loan Market," Discussion papers 06004, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    19. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1991. "Why is there debt?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 77(Jul), pages 3-19.
    20. Anginer, Deniz & de la Torre, Augusto & Ize, Alain, 2011. "Risk absorption by the state: when is it good public policy ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5893, The World Bank.
    21. Karel Janda, 2008. "Which Government Interventions Are Good in Alleviating Credit Market Failures?," Working Papers IES 2008/12, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2008.
    22. Venetoklis, Takis, 2001. "Business Subsidies and Bureaucratic Behaviour," Research Reports 79, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
    23. Venetoklis, Takis, 2001. "Business Subsidies and Bureaucratic Behaviour - A Revised Approach," Research Reports 83, VATT Institute for Economic Research.

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