The perverse effect of government credit subsidies on banking risk
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- Riccardo De Bonis & Fabio Farabullini & Miria Rocchelli & Alessandra Salvio, 2012.
"A Quantitative Look at the Italian Banking System: Evidence from a New Dataset since 1861,"
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More about this item
Keywordsbanks; credit risk; government subsidies;
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2012-05-29 (Banking)
- NEP-RMG-2012-05-29 (Risk Management)
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