The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationships
This paper provides a simple model showing that the extent of competition in credit markets is important in determining the value of lending relationships. Creditors are more likely to finance credit constrained firms when credit markets are concentrated because it is easier for these creditors to internalize the benefits of assisting the firms. The model has implications about the availability and the price of credit as firms age in different markets. The paper offers evidence for these implications from small business data. It concludes with conjectures on the costs and benefits of liberalizing financial markets, as well as the timing of such reforms.
|Date of creation:||Nov 1994|
|Publication status:||published as Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1995, pp. 407-443.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
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