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Credit guarantees in a credit market with adverse selection

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  • Karel Janda

Abstract

This paper deals with government interventions in agricultural credit markets in the Czech Republic. I first describe the institutional setting and the empirics of agricultural credit in the Czech Republic. I explain the activities of the Czech Agricultural Guarantee Fund and compare it with similar institutions dealing with the support of agricultural credit in transition and developed market economies. Then I introduce an adverse selection model of credit provision with proportional credit guarantees. The model distinguishes two market regimes - a developed post-transition market economy and a transition economy. This distinction between transition and post-transition economies leads to different results generated by credit markets. Most notably, there is a failure of collateral as a screening instrument in credit markets of transition economies. With economic stabilization collateral resumes its role as a screening instrument.

Suggested Citation

  • Karel Janda, 2003. "Credit guarantees in a credit market with adverse selection," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2003(4), pages 331-349.
    • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpep:v:2003:y:2003:i:4:id:225
    DOI: 10.18267/j.pep.225
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    Cited by:

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    2. František Turnovec & Jacek W. Mercik & Mariusz Mazurkiewicz, 2004. "Power Indices: Shapley-Shubik OR Penrose-Banzhaf?," Working Papers IES 48, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2004.
    3. Karel Janda, 2006. "Lender and Borrower as Principal and Agent," Working Papers IES 2006/24, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2006.
    4. Ciaian, Pavel & Pokrivcak, Jan and Katarina Szegenyova, 2012. "Do agricultural subsidies crowd out or stimulate rural credit market institutions? The case of EU Common Agricultural Policy," European Integration online Papers (EIoP), European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A), vol. 16, November.
    5. Kateřina Šmídková & Aleš Bulíř, 2004. "Would Fast Sailing towards the Euro Be Smooth? What Fundamental Real Exchange Rates Tells Us about Acceding Economies," Working Papers IES 64, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2004.
    6. Adam Geršl, 2007. "Political Economy of Public Deficit: Perspectives for Constitutional Reform," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 67-86, March.
    7. Kodera J. & Vosvrda M., 2005. "Production, Capital Stock and Price Dynamics in Simple Model of Closed Economy," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 287, Society for Computational Economics.
    8. Wadim Strielkowski & Cathal O'Donoghue, 2006. "Ready to Go? EU Enlargement and Migration Potential: Lessons for the Czech Republic in the Context of Irish Migration Experience," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2006(1), pages 14-28.
    9. Tomáš Cahlík & Tomáš Honzák & Jana Honzáková & Marcel Jiřina & Natálie Reichlová, 2005. "Convergence of Consumption Structure," Working Papers IES 99, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
    10. Jiří Hlaváček & Michal Hlaváček, 2006. ""Principal - Agent" Problem in the Context of the Economic Survival [Problém "principál - agent" při maximalizaci pravděpodobnosti ekonomického přežití]," Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2006(3), pages 18-33.
    11. Karel Janda, 2006. "Agency Theory Approach to the Contracting between Lender and Borrower [Smluvní vztah mezi věřitelem a dlužníkem z hlediska přístupu teorie zastoupení]," Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2006(3), pages 34-47.
    12. František Turnovec, 2007. "New Measure of Voting Power," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 04-14, March.
    13. FrantiÜek Turnovec, 2005. "Arithmetics of Property Rights: A Leontief-type Model of Ownership Structures," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 23, pages 371-379.
    14. Karel Janda, 2005. "The Comparative Statics of the Effects of Credit Guarantees and Subsidies in the Competitive Lending Market," Working Papers IES 82, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
    15. L. Čechura, 2008. "Theoretical-empirical analysis of the role of the SGAFF in financing of farmers' activities," Agricultural Economics, Czech Academy of Agricultural Sciences, vol. 54(10), pages 476-488.
    16. Miloslav Vošvrda & Lukáš Vácha, 2007. "Heterogeneous Agents Model with the Worst Out Algorithm," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 54-66, March.
    17. Jiří Hlaváček, 2007. "Systém pojištění vkladů v České republice: historie, současný stav a porovnání s Evropskou unií [The deposit guarantee-scheme in the Czech republic: history, status quo and comparison with the euro," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2007(4), pages 458-472.
    18. František Turnovec, 2004. "Economic Research in the Czech Republic: Entering International Academic Market," Working Papers IES 47, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2004.
    19. Cheng Wang & Stephen D. Williamson, 1998. "Debt Contracts with Financial Intermediation with Costly Screening," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(3), pages 573-595, August.
    20. Karel Janda, 2005. "The Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of the Budget Cost of the Czech Supporting and Guarantee Agricultural and Forestry Fund," Working Papers IES 86, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
    21. Karel Janda & Eva Michalíková & Věra Potácelová, 2010. "Gravitační a fiskální modely státní podpory exportních úvěrů v České republice [Gravity and Fiscal Models of Government Support of Export Credit in the Czech Republic]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2010(3), pages 305-325.
    22. Tomáš Cahlík & Adam Geršl & Michal Hlaváček & Michael Berlemann, 2005. "Market Prices as Indicators of Political Events Evidence from the Experimental Market on the Czech Republic Parliamentary Election in 2002," Working Papers IES 77, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
    23. Petr Marek, 2007. "Agency theory and Its Impact on Corporate Finance Theory [Vliv teorie zastoupení na teorii podnikových financí]," Český finanční a účetní časopis, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2007(2), pages 6-16.
    24. Laura Brad & Gabriel Popescu & Alina Zaharia & Maria Claudia Diaconeasa & Daniela Mihai, 2018. "Exploring the Road to Agricultural Sustainability by Assessing the EU Debt Influencing Factors," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(7), pages 1-46, July.
    25. Karel JANDA, 2006. "An Analysis of the Cost of the Supporting and Guarantee Agricultural and Forestry Fund (SGAFF) in the Czech Republic," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 56(09-10), pages 416-434, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    government intervention; adverse selection; agricultural credit;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • P34 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Finance
    • Q14 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Finance

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