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Agency theory and Its Impact on Corporate Finance Theory

Author

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  • Petr Marek

Abstract

Agency theory for the first time appeared in literature in 70s years at the works of Ross (1973), Jensen and Meckling (1976). Their starting points were transaction costs, asymmetric information, moral hazard and adverse selection. This theory gradually enforced not only in economic scientific disciplines but even in sociology and politics. From point of the view of corporate finance is the most important for the development of the discipline impact of agency costs on market value of firm. The theory has significant place in the explanation of optimal capital structure and dividend policy. Increasingly more and more representatives is appearing in the Czech scientific literature as well.

Suggested Citation

  • Petr Marek, 2007. "Agency theory and Its Impact on Corporate Finance Theory," Český finanční a účetní časopis, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2007(2), pages 6-16.
  • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlcfu:v:2007:y:2007:i:2:id:217:p:6-16
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Williamson, Oliver E, 1988. " Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(3), pages 567-591, July.
    2. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    3. Karel Janda, 2003. "Credit guarantees in a credit market with adverse selection," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2003(4).
    4. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    5. Easterbrook, Frank H, 1984. "Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(4), pages 650-659, September.
    6. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-139, May.
    7. Jan Frait, 2002. "Morální hazard a výstup z bankovního sektoru," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 52(3), pages 102-104, March.
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    9. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    10. Stanislav Klazar, 2006. "Tax Revenue Prediction under Condition of Imperfect Control over Tax-Collecting Authority," Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2006(3), pages 48-62.
    11. Karel Janda, 2006. "Agency Theory Approach to the Contracting between Lender and Borrower," Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2006(3), pages 34-47.
    12. Pavel Kraus, 2006. "Impact of Taxes and Agency Costs on Dividend Policy," Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2006(3), pages 63-72.
    13. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Náklady zastoupení; Agency Costs; Agency theory; Teorie zastoupení; Corporate finance theory; Teorie podnikových financí;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

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