IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/fau/fauart/v56y2006i9-10p416-434.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

An Analysis of the Cost of the Supporting and Guarantee Agricultural and Forestry Fund (SGAFF) in the Czech Republic

Author

Listed:
  • Karel JANDA

    (Transgas-RWE Chair in Economics and the Department of Microeconomics and Mathematical Methods, Charles University, Prague and the Department of Banking and Insurance, University of Economics, Prague)

Abstract

The paper analyzes the cost to the Czech state budget of the Supporting and Guarantee Agricultural and Forestry Fund (SGAFF). In the empirical part of the paper, the author shows that the SGAFF portfolio has sufficient value to cover the expected costs of the credit guarantees and subsidies offered by the fund. The theoretical model looks at government interventions designed to decrease the credit rationing of farmers with high probability of success. The theoretical model shows that, with uniform non-targeted supports, the Czech government unambiguously prefers lump-sum guarantees to interest-rate subsidies. With support targeted wholly to disadvantaged farmers, the cost of lump-sum guarantees, proportional guarantees, and interest-rates subsidies are all equal.

Suggested Citation

  • Karel JANDA, 2006. "An Analysis of the Cost of the Supporting and Guarantee Agricultural and Forestry Fund (SGAFF) in the Czech Republic," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 56(09-10), pages 416-434, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:fau:fauart:v:56:y:2006:i:9-10:p:416-434
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://journal.fsv.cuni.cz/storage/1067_s_416_434.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Karel Janda, 2003. "Credit guarantees in a credit market with adverse selection," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2003(4), pages 331-349.
    2. Gale, William G, 1991. "Economic Effects of Federal Credit Programs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 133-152, March.
    3. Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, 1976. "Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 651-666.
    4. Karel Janda, 1994. "Modelování rizika akciového portfolia (Modelling Risks of Share Portfolio)," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 44(9), pages 463-472, September.
    5. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 1997. "Microeconomics of Banking," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061937, December.
    6. R. Glenn Hubbard, 1990. "Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number glen90-1, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Karel Janda, 2005. "The Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of the Budget Cost of the Czech Supporting and Guarantee Agricultural and Forestry Fund," Working Papers IES 86, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
    2. Janvier D. Nkurunziza, 2005. "Reputation and Credit without Collateral in Africa`s Formal Banking," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2005-02, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    3. Neyer, Ulrike, 2004. "Asymmetric information in credit markets--implications for the transition in Eastern Germany," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 61-78, March.
    4. Karel Janda, 2006. "Agency Theory Approach to the Contracting between Lender and Borrower [Smluvní vztah mezi věřitelem a dlužníkem z hlediska přístupu teorie zastoupení]," Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2006(3), pages 34-47.
    5. Hoggarth, Glenn & Reis, Ricardo & Saporta, Victoria, 2002. "Costs of banking system instability: Some empirical evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 825-855, May.
    6. Jan Frederik Slijkerman & David J.C. Smant & Casper G. de Vries, 2004. "Credit Rationing Effects of Credit Value-at-Risk," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-032/2, Tinbergen Institute.
    7. Karel Janda, 2003. "Credit guarantees in a credit market with adverse selection," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2003(4), pages 331-349.
    8. Ma, Chien-Hui & Smith, Bruce D., 1996. "Credit market imperfections and economic development: Theory and evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 351-387, March.
    9. Charles W. Calomiris, 1993. "Financial Factors in the Great Depression," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 61-85, Spring.
    10. Ferri, Giovanni & Murro, Pierluigi, 2015. "Do firm–bank ‘odd couples’ exacerbate credit rationing?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 231-251.
    11. Agur, Itai, 2012. "Credit rationing when banks are funding constrained," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 220-227.
    12. R. Glenn Hubbard, 1998. "Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 193-225, March.
    13. Calomiris, Charles W. & Himmelberg, Charles P. & Wachtel, Paul, 1995. "Commercial paper, corporate finance, and the business cycle: a microeconomic perspective," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 203-250, June.
    14. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1994. "Does adverse selection justify government intervention in loan markets?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 61-95.
    15. Gertjan W. Vlieghe, 2001. "Indicators of fragility in the UK corporate sector," Bank of England working papers 146, Bank of England.
    16. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Thomas M. Eisenbach & Yuliy Sannikov, 2012. "Macroeconomics with Financial Frictions: A Survey," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000384, David K. Levine.
    17. Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, 2009. "Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries With a Consumer Credit Field Experiment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(6), pages 1993-2008, November.
    18. Benito Arruñada, 2011. "Mandatory accounting disclosure by small private companies," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 377-413, December.
    19. Corinne Le Gallic, 1995. "Déréglementation financière, cycle et croissance," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(2), pages 255-281.
    20. Karel Janda, 2006. "Lender and Borrower as Principal and Agent," Working Papers IES 2006/24, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2006.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    credit; guarantees; subsidies; transition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • P31 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fau:fauart:v:56:y:2006:i:9-10:p:416-434. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Natalie Svarcova (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/icunicz.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.