Effectiveness of Credit Guarantees in the Japanese Loan Market
From 1998-2001, the Japanese government, in an effort to stimulate the flow of funds to the small business sector, implemented a massive credit guarantee program that was unprecedented in both scale and scope. Because the program was accessible by nearly every small firm we are able to clearly identify the policy effect. The program, therefore, presents a unique opportunity to determine if government intervention can improve the efficiency of credit allocation among bank-dependent small businesses. Utilizing a new panel data set of Japanese firms, which covers the implementation period of the program, we empirically test the theoretical predictions of Mankiw's (1986) adverse selection model. The model of credit markets under asymmetric information allows us to investigate whether government credit programs do more to stimulate small business investment, or serve to worsen the adverse selection problems prevalent in credit markets. We find evidence consistent with the former hypothesis. Specifically, we find that (1) program participants significantly increase their leverage, especially their use of long-term loans, and (2) with the exception of high-risk firms, become more efficient.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.rieti.go.jp/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Wenli Li, 1998. "Government loan, guarantee, and grant programs: an evaluation," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Fall, pages 25-52.
- N. Gregory Mankiw, 1986.
"The Allocation of Credit and Financial Collapse,"
NBER Working Papers
1786, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gale, William G, 1991.
"Economic Effects of Federal Credit Programs,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 133-52, March.
- Williamson, Stephen D, 1994.
"Do Informational Frictions Justify Federal Credit Programs?,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 26(3), pages 523-44, August.
- Stephen D. Williamson, 1994. "Do informational frictions justify federal credit programs?," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 523-551.
- Gale, William G., 1990.
"Federal lending and the market for credit,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 177-193, July.
- Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 2001.
"Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data,"
MIT Press Books,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262232197, June.
- Jeffrey M Wooldridge, 2010. "Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262232588, June.
- Ben R. Craig & William E. Jackson, III & James B. Thomson, 2005. "SBA-loan guarantees and local economic growth," Working Paper 0503, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
- Varouj Aivazian & Dipak Mazumdar & Eric Santor, 2003. "Financial Constraints and Investment: Assessing the Impact of a World Bank Loan Program on Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Sri Lanka," Working Papers 03-37, Bank of Canada.
- Chaney, Paul K. & Thakor, Anjan V., 1985.
"Incentive effects of benevolent intervention : The case of government loan guarantees,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 169-189, March.
- Paul K. Chaney & Anjan V. Thakor, 2004. "Incentive Effects of Benevolent Intervention - The case of government loan guarantees," Finance 0411047, EconWPA.
- William G. Gale, 1989.
"Collateral, Rationing, and Government Intervention in Credit Markets,"
NBER Working Papers
3024, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- William G. Gale, 1990. "Collateral, Rationing, and Government Intervention in Credit Markets," NBER Chapters, in: Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment, pages 43-62 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- William G. Gale, 1989. "Collateral, Rationing and Government Intervention in Credit Markets," NBER Working Papers 3083, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- William G. Gale, 1989. "Collateral, Rationing, and Government Intervention in Credit Markets," UCLA Economics Working Papers 554, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Innes, Robert, 1991. "Investment and government intervention in credit markets when there is asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 347-381, December.
- "Iwamoto, Yasushi", 2001. "Fiscal Investment and Loan Program―A Perspective on Government Interventions in the Japanese Financial Sector―," Economic Review, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 52(1), pages 2-15, January.
- Cowling, Marc & Mitchell, Peter, 2003. " Is the Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme Hazardous for Banks or Helpful to Small Business?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 63-71, August.
- Bruce D. Smith & Michael J. Stutzer, 1989. "Credit Rationing and Government Loan Programs: A Welfare Analysis," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 17(2), pages 177-193.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eti:dpaper:06004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (NUKATANI Sorahiko)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.