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Risk-bearing by the state: When is it good public policy?

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  • Anginer, Deniz
  • de la Torre, Augusto
  • Ize, Alain

Abstract

The global financial crisis brought government guarantees to the forefront of the debate. Based on a review of frictions that hinder financial contracting, this paper concludes that the common justifications for government guarantees—i.e., principal-agent frictions or un-internalized externalities in an environment of risk neutrality—are flawed. Even where risk is purely idiosyncratic—and thus diversifiable in principle—government guarantees (typically granted via development banks/agencies) can be justified if private lenders are risk averse and because of the state's comparative advantage over markets in resolving the collective action frictions that hinder risk spreading. To exploit this advantage while keeping moral hazard in check, however, development banks/agencies have to price their guarantees fairly, crowd in the private sector, and reduce their excessive risk aversion. The latter requires overcoming agency frictions between managers and owner (the state), which would likely entail a significant reshaping of development banks’ mandates, governance, and risk management systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Anginer, Deniz & de la Torre, Augusto & Ize, Alain, 2014. "Risk-bearing by the state: When is it good public policy?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 10(C), pages 76-86.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:finsta:v:10:y:2014:i:c:p:76-86 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2013.03.006
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    Cited by:

    1. Agusman, Agusman & Cullen, Grant S. & Gasbarro, Dominic & Monroe, Gary S. & Zumwalt, J. Kenton, 2014. "Government intervention, bank ownership and risk-taking during the Indonesian financial crisis," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, pages 114-131.
    2. Kempa, Karol & Moslener, Ulf, 2015. "Climate policy with the chequebook: Economic considerations on climate investment support," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series 219, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
    3. repec:wbk:wbpubs:27529 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Carlos Gozzi, & Schmukler, Sergio, 2016. "Public Credit Guarantees and Access to Finance," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1122, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    5. Hennecke, Peter & Neuberger, Doris & Ulbricht, Dirk, 2017. "The economic and fiscal value of German guarantee banks," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 152, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    6. Goodell, John W., 2016. "Do for-profit universities induce bad student loans?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 173-184.
    7. Chatzouz, Moustafa & Gereben, Áron & Lang, Frank & Torfs, Wouter, 2017. "Credit guarantee schemes for SME lending in Western Europe," EIB Working Papers 2017/02, European Investment Bank (EIB).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Credit default guarantees; Credit default insurance; Risk premia; Risk aversion; Public guarantees; Public risk absorption; Arrow–Lind theorem; Development banks;

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance

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