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Containing systemic risk : paradigm-based perspectives on regulatory reform

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  • de la Torre, Augusto
  • Ize, Alain

Abstract

Financial crises can happen for a variety of reasons: (a) nobody really understands what is going on (the collective cognition paradigm); (b) some understand better than others and take advantage of their knowledge (the asymmetric information paradigm); (c) everybody understands, but crises are a natural part of the financial landscape (the costly enforcement paradigm); or (d) everybody understands, yet no one acts because private and social interests do not coincide (the collective action paradigm). The four paradigms have different and often conflicting prudential policy implications. This paper proposes and discusses three sets of reforms that would give due weight to the insights from the collective action and collective cognition paradigms by redrawing the regulatory perimeter to internalize systemic risk without promoting dynamic regulatory arbitrage; introducing a truly systemic liquidity regulation that moves away from a purely idiosyncratic focus on maturity mismatches; and building up the supervisory function while avoiding the pitfalls of expanded official oversight.

Suggested Citation

  • de la Torre, Augusto & Ize, Alain, 2011. "Containing systemic risk : paradigm-based perspectives on regulatory reform," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5523, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5523
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Anginer, Deniz & de la Torre, Augusto & Ize, Alain, 2014. "Risk-bearing by the state: When is it good public policy?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 10(C), pages 76-86.
    2. Augusto de la Torre & Erik Feyen & Alain Ize, 2013. "Financial Development: Structure and Dynamics," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 27(3), pages 514-541.
    3. Beck, Thorsten & Feyen, Erik, 2013. "Benchmarking financial systems : introducing the financial possibility frontier," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6615, The World Bank.
    4. Kowalski, Tadeusz, 2013. "Globalization and Transformation in Central European Countries: The Case of Poland," MPRA Paper 59306, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Anginer, Deniz & de la Torre, Augusto & Ize, Alain, 2011. "Risk absorption by the state: when is it good public policy ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5893, The World Bank.
    6. Stephany Griffith-Jones, 2014. "Pour une libéralisation prudente du secteur financier : implications en matière de politique économique," Revue d’économie du développement, De Boeck Université, vol. 22(2), pages 81-112.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Debt Markets; Emerging Markets; Financial Intermediation; Banks&Banking Reform; Labor Policies;

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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