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Regulatory reform : integrating paradigms

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  • de la Torre, Augusto
  • Ize, Alain

Abstract

The Subprime crisis largely resulted from failures to internalize systemic risk evenly across financial intermediaries and recognize the implications of Knightian uncertainty and mood swings. A successful reform of prudential regulation will need to integrate more harmoniously the three paradigms of moral hazard, externalities, and uncertainty. This is a tall order because each paradigm leads to different and often inconsistent regulatory implications. Moreover, efforts to address the central problem under one paradigm can make the problems under the others worse. To avoid regulatory arbitrage and ensure that externalities are uniformly internalized, all prudentially regulated intermediaries should be subjected to the same capital adequacy requirements, and unregulated intermediaries should be financed only by regulated intermediaries. Reflecting the importance of uncertainty, the new regulatory architecture will also need to rely less on markets and more on"holistic"supervision, and incorporate countercyclical norms that can be adjusted in light of changing circumstances.

Suggested Citation

  • de la Torre, Augusto & Ize, Alain, 2009. "Regulatory reform : integrating paradigms," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4842, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4842
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    Cited by:

    1. Anginer, Deniz & de la Torre, Augusto & Ize, Alain, 2014. "Risk-bearing by the state: When is it good public policy?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 10(C), pages 76-86.
    2. Augusto de la Torre & Erik Feyen & Alain Ize, 2013. "Financial Development: Structure and Dynamics," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 27(3), pages 514-541.
    3. Beck, Thorsten & Feyen, Erik, 2013. "Benchmarking financial systems : introducing the financial possibility frontier," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6615, The World Bank.
    4. T.V.S. Ramamohan Rao, 2010. "Financial crisis, efficient bailouts, and regulatory policy," Macroeconomics and Finance in Emerging Market Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(2), pages 167-188.
    5. Castro, Cesar D., 2015. "Riesgo sistémico en el sistema financiero peruano," Revista Estudios Económicos, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, issue 29, pages 77-90.
    6. Ize,Alain & De La Torre,Augusto, 2013. "The conceptual foundations of macroprudential policy : a roadmap," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6576, The World Bank.
    7. Augusto de la Torre & Alain Ize, 2010. "Containing Systemic Risk: Paradigm-Based Perspectives on Regulatory Reform," ECONOMIA JOURNAL, THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION - LACEA, vol. 0(Fall 2010), pages 25-64, August.
    8. Julian Cristia & William Evans & Beomsoo Kim, 2011. "Does Contracting-Out Primary Care Services Work? The Case of Rural Guatemala," Research Department Publications 4728, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    9. Majnoni, Giovanni, 2010. "The co-movement of asset returns and the micro-macro focus of prudential oversight," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5456, The World Bank.
    10. Beck, Thorsten, 2010. "Regulatory Reform After the Crisis: Opportunities and Pitfalls," CEPR Discussion Papers 7733, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Canuto, Otaviano & Cavallari, Matheus, 2013. "Monetary policy and macroprudential regulation : whither emerging markets," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6310, The World Bank.
    12. repec:bla:intfin:v:19:y:2016:i:3:p:333-352 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Canuto, Otaviano, 2011. "How Complementary Are Prudential Regulation and Monetary Policy?," World Bank - Economic Premise, The World Bank, issue 60, pages 1-7, June.
    14. Augusto de la Torre & Alain Ize, 2009. "Containing Systemic Risk : Are Regulatory Reform Proposals on the Right Track?," World Bank Other Operational Studies 10967, The World Bank.
    15. Marc G Quintyn & Rosaria Vega Pansini & Donato Masciandaro, 2011. "The Economic Crisis; Did Financial Supervision Matter?," IMF Working Papers 11/261, International Monetary Fund.
    16. Masciandaro, Donato & Pansini, Rosaria Vega & Quintyn, Marc, 2013. "The economic crisis: Did supervision architecture and governance matter?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 578-596.
    17. Gabriel Aparici & Fernando Sepúlveda, 2010. "Household Credit Markets During the Financial Crisis of 2008/2009," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 591, Central Bank of Chile.
    18. Anginer, Deniz & de la Torre, Augusto & Ize, Alain, 2011. "Risk absorption by the state: when is it good public policy ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5893, The World Bank.
    19. David A. Mermelstein, 2017. "Hacia un indicador de vulnerabilidad bancaria basado en pruebas de estrés," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 610, Universidad del CEMA.
    20. de la Torre, Augusto & Didier, Tatiana & Pinat, Magali, 2014. "Can Latin America tap the globalization upside ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6837, The World Bank.

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    Keywords

    Debt Markets; Banks&Banking Reform; Emerging Markets; Labor Policies; Financial Intermediation;

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