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War die Finanzkrise vorhersehbar?

  • Gunther Tichy
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    The Queen's question "Why did no one see it coming" provoked professional economists as well. A fierce discussion arose how to modify and improve theory and models. A survey of the literature reveals that almost a hundred analyses warned against the instability of several mechanism, be it bubbles, oversupply of funds, financial innovations, behaviour of financial institutions or regulation. Most observers predicted a recession, nobody a worldwide crisis. The crisis arose as all these mechanisms worked together and produced a surprise. Surprises appear to be the central elements of deep financial crises. Therefore the chances are odd for forecasting. Copyright 2010 die Autoren. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 2010 Verein für Socialpolitik.

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    Article provided by Verein für Socialpolitik in its journal Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik.

    Volume (Year): 11 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 4 (November)
    Pages: 356-382

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    Handle: RePEc:bla:perwir:v:11:y:2010:i:4:p:356-382
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