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Instabile Finanzmärkte

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  • Franke, Günter
  • Krahnen, Jan Pieter

Abstract

Die Vorstellung selbst-stabilisierender, zum Gleichgewicht tendierender Finanzmärkte, lange Zeit als Selbstverständlichkeit angesehen, ist durch die aktuelle Banken- und Kreditkrise in Frage gestellt. Trotz ausgefeilten Risikomanagements der Banken und einer an Basel II orientierten Aufsicht ist es in den Jahren 2007-2009 zu einem Zusammenbruch des Interbankenmarktes und weiter Teile der Anleihemärkte gekommen. Die hierdurch erzwungenen massiven Staatsinterventionen zur Bankenrettung sind ohne Beispiel in der modernen Wirtschaftsgeschichte. In diesem Essay suchen wir nach Ansatzpunkten einer Erklärung für die Instabilität der Finanzmärkte. Als zentrale Krisenursache sehen wir Schwächen der Informationsarchitektur, deren Aufgabe darin besteht, glaubwürdige Information für Investoren bereitzustellen. Drei Determinanten der Instabilität werden herausgestellt, erstens die Nutzung von Schuldtiteln verbunden mit hohen Verschuldungsgraden, zweitens die Handelbarkeit von Titeln verbunden mit erhöhter Risikoübernahme, sowie drittens die zunehmende Komplexität von Finanzprodukten und Finanznetzwerken verbunden mit einer Homogenisierung der Aktiva- und Risikostrukturen von Finanzinstituten. Alle drei Faktoren verstärken die Anfälligkeit des Finanzsystems und zugleich die Bedeutung der Informationsarchitektur. Hieraus lassen sich Anforderungen an eine sinnvolle Reform der Regulierung ableiten. Neben den Anreizproblemen, die Gegenstand einer weiteren Arbeit sind (Franke/Krahnen 2009), diskutieren wir hier vier Kernthemen: glaubwürdige Informationen, makroprudentielle Aufsicht, robuste Eigenkapitalstandards und eine notwendige Risikobegrenzung auf Derivatemärkten.

Suggested Citation

  • Franke, Günter & Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 2009. "Instabile Finanzmärkte," CFS Working Paper Series 2009/13, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cfswop:200913
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    Cited by:

    1. Gunther Tichy, 2010. "War die Finanzkrise vorhersehbar?," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 11(4), pages 356-382, November.
    2. Christoph Zeitler & Bernd Rudolph & Christian Kirchner & Christoph Kaserer & Markus Ferber, 2010. "Regulierung und Aufsicht der Banken: Brauchen wir Basel III?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 63(03), pages 03-20, February.
    3. Jan Priewe, 2010. "What Went Wrong? Alternative interpretations of the global financial crisis," Competence Centre on Money, Trade, Finance and Development 1002, Hochschule fuer Technik und Wirtschaft, Berlin.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial Crisis; Information; Regulation; Banking; Bond Ratings; Capital Markets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy

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