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shadow banking: a review of the literature

  • Tobias Adrian Author-Name: Adam B. Ashcraft

We provide an overview of the rapidly evolving literature on shadow credit intermediation. The shadow banking system consists of a web of specialised financial institutions that conduct credit, maturity, and liquidity transformation without direct, explicit access to public backstops. The lack of such access to sources of government liquidity and credit backstops makes shadow banks inherently fragile. Much of shadow banking activities is intertwined with the operations of core regulated institutions such as bank holding companies and insurance companies, thus creating a source of systemic risk for the financial system at large. We review fundamental reasons for the existence of shadow banking, explain the functioning of shadow banking institutions and activities, discuss why shadow banks need to be regulated, and review the impact of recent reform efforts on shadow banking credit intermediation.

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This chapter was published in: Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume (ed.) , , chapter 1, pages , 2012,4th quarter update.
This item is provided by Palgrave Macmillan in its series The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics with number v:6:year:2012:doi:3890.
Handle: RePEc:pal:dofeco:v:6:year:2012:doi:3890
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  1. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, 2009. "Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2358, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Sep 2009.
  2. Raghuram G. Rajan, 2005. "Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?," Working Papers id:248, eSocialSciences.
  3. Zoltan Pozsar & Tobias Adrian & Adam Ashcraft & Hayley Boesky, 2010. "Shadow banking," Staff Reports 458, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  4. Lasse Heje Pederson & Markus K Brunnermeier, 2007. "Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity," FMG Discussion Papers dp580, Financial Markets Group.
  5. Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 2011. "A Model of Shadow Banking," Working Papers 576, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  6. Tobias Adrian & Brian Begalle & Adam Copeland & Antoine Martin, 2012. "Repo and securities lending," Staff Reports 529, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    • Tobias Adrian & Brian Begalle & Adam Copeland & Antoine Martin, 2013. "Repo and Securities Lending," NBER Chapters, in: Risk Topography: Systemic Risk and Macro Modeling, pages 131-148 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Tobias Adrian & Christopher R. Burke & James J. McAndrews, 2009. "The Federal Reserve's Primary Dealer Credit Facility," Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 15(Aug).
  8. Michael J. Fleming & Warren B. Hrung & Frank M. Keane, 2010. "Repo market effects of the Term Securities Lending Facility," Staff Reports 426, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  9. Adam Copeland & Antoine Martin & Michael Walker, 2014. "Repo Runs: Evidence from the Tri-Party Repo Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(6), pages 2343-2380, December.
  10. Adrian, T. & Shin, H S., 2009. "The shadow banking system: implications for fi nancial regulation," Financial Stability Review, Banque de France, issue 13, pages 1-10, September.
  11. Patrick E. McCabe & Marco Cipriani & Michael Holscher & Antoine Martin, 2012. "The minimum balance at risk: a proposal to mitigate the systemic risks posed by money market funds," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2012-47, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  12. W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, 2004. "Fussing and fuming over Fannie and Freddie: how much smoke, how much fire?," FRB Atlanta Working Paper No. 2004-26, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  13. Merton, Robert C. & Bodie, Zvi, 1993. "Deposit insurance reform: a functional approach," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 1-34, June.
  14. Tobias Adrian & Nina Boyarchenko, 2012. "Intermediary Leverage Cycles and Financial Stability," Working Papers 2012-010, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
  15. Acharya, Viral V. & Schnabl, Philipp & Suarez, Gustavo, 2013. "Securitization without risk transfer," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(3), pages 515-536.
  16. Holmstrom, B & Tirole, J, 1996. "Private and Public Supply of Liquidity," Working papers 96-21, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  17. Antoine Martin & David Skeie & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 2014. "Repo Runs," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(4), pages 957-989.
  18. John Geanakoplos & Ana Fostel, 2008. "Leverage Cycles and the Anxious Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1211-44, September.
  19. Wayne Passmore & Shane M. Sherlund & Gillian Burgess, 2005. "The Effect of Housing Government-Sponsored Enterprises on Mortgage Rates," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 33(3), pages 427-463, 09.
  20. Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft, 2012. "Shadow banking regulation," Staff Reports 559, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  21. Tobias Adrian & Emanuel Moench & Hyun Song Shin, 2010. "Financial intermediation, asset prices, and macroeconomic dynamics," Staff Reports 422, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  22. Adrian, Tobias & Shin, Hyun Song, 2010. "Liquidity and leverage," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 418-437, July.
  23. Gorton, Gary, 1985. "Clearinghouses and the Origin of Central Banking in the United States," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(02), pages 277-283, June.
  24. Mathis, Jérôme & McAndrews, James & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2009. "Rating the raters: Are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 657-674, July.
  25. Olivier Armantier & Sandra Krieger & James McAndrews, 2008. "The Federal Reserve's Term Auction Facility," Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 14(Jul).
  26. Tyler Wiggers & Adam B. Ashcraft, 2012. "Defaults and losses on commercial real estate bonds during the Great Depression era," Staff Reports 544, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  27. Vitaly M. Bord & João A. C. Santos, 2012. "The rise of the originate-to-distribute model and the role of banks in financial intermediation," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Jul, pages 1-14.
  28. Benjamin J. Keys & Tanmoy Mukherjee & Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, 2010. "Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 125(1), pages 307-362, February.
  29. Tobias Adrian & Karin Kimbrough & Dina Marchioni, 2011. "The Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue May, pages 25-39.
  30. Matthew Jaremski, 2010. "Free Bank Failures: Risky Bonds versus Undiversified Portfolios," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(8), pages 1565-1587, December.
  31. Tobias Adrian & Michael J. Fleming, 2005. "What financing data reveal about dealer leverage," Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 11(Mar).
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