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Monetary Policy as Financial-Stability Regulation

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  • Jeremy C. Stein

Abstract

This paper develops a model that speaks to the goals and methods of financial-stability policies. There are three main points. First, from a normative perspective, the model defines the fundamental market failure to be addressed, namely that unregulated private money creation can lead to an externality in which intermediaries issue too much short-term debt and leave the system excessively vulnerable to costly financial crises. Second, it shows how in a simple economy where commercial banks are the only lenders, conventional monetary-policy tools such as open-market operations can be used to regulate this externality, while in more advanced economies it may be helpful to supplement monetary policy with other measures. Third, from a positive perspective, the model provides an account of how monetary policy can influence bank lending and real activity, even in a world where prices adjust frictionlessly and there are other transactions media besides bank-created money that are outside the control of the central bank.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeremy C. Stein, 2011. "Monetary Policy as Financial-Stability Regulation," NBER Working Papers 16883, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16883
    Note: CF ME
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Neli Muntean, 2016. "Elaboration and Application of the Stability Dynamic Model meant for Risks Analysis and Evaluation," International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, Human Resource Management Academic Research Society, International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, vol. 6(8), pages 146-168, August.
    2. Antoine Martin & David Skeie & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 2014. "Repo Runs," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(4), pages 957-989.
    3. Jean-Pierre Landau, 2016. "A liquidity-based approach to macroprudential policy," BIS Papers chapters,in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Macroprudential policy, volume 86, pages 147-156 Bank for International Settlements.
    4. Gennaioli, Nicola & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 2012. "Neglected risks, financial innovation, and financial fragility," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(3), pages 452-468.
    5. Paolo Angelini & Sergio Nicoletti-Altimari & Ignazio Visco, 2012. "Macroprudential, microprudential and monetary policies: conflicts, complementarities and trade-offs," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 140, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    6. Zhiguo He & Péter Kondor, 2016. "Inefficient Investment Waves," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 735-780, March.
    7. Matteo Ciccarelli & Angela Maddaloni & Jose Luis Peydro, 2015. "Trusting the Bankers: A New Look at the Credit Channel of Monetary Policy," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(4), pages 979-1002, October.
    8. Zhiguo He & Gregor Matvos, 2012. "Debt and Creative Destruction: Why Could Subsidizing Corporate Debt be Optimal?," NBER Working Papers 17920, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Malgorzata Olszak & Mateusz Pipien & Iwona Kowalska & Sylwia Roszkowska, 2015. "The impact of capital on lending in publicly-traded and privately- held banks in the EU," Faculty of Management Working Paper Series 72015, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management.
    10. Francesco Giavazzi & Alberto Giovannini, 2011. "Central Banks and the Financial System," Chapters,in: Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 1 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    11. Emilios Avgouleas, 2015. "Bank Leverage Ratios and Financial Stability: A Micro- and Macroprudential Perspective," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_849, Levy Economics Institute.
    12. repec:agr:journl:v:1(614):y:2018:i:1(614):p:41-54 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Solomon Sorin & Golo Natasa, 2013. "Minsky Financial Instability, Interscale Feedback, Percolation and Marshall–Walras Disequilibrium," Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, De Gruyter, vol. 3(3), pages 167-260, October.
    14. Renata Karkowska, 2015. "The role of investment banking in systemic risk profiles. Evidence from a panel of EU banking sectors," Faculty of Management Working Paper Series 22015, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management.
    15. Gabriel Jiménez & Atif Mian & José-Luis Peydró & Jesús Saurina, 2011. "Local versus aggregate lending channels: the effects of securitization on corporate credit supply," Working Papers 1124, Banco de España;Working Papers Homepage.
    16. Bank for International Settlements, 2016. "Macroprudential policy," BIS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 86, November.
    17. repec:gam:jrisks:v:5:y:2017:i:4:p:55-:d:115890 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Zoltan Pozsar, 2011. "Institutional Cash Pools and the Triffin Dilemma of the U.S. Banking System," IMF Working Papers 11/190, International Monetary Fund.
    19. Lukas Scheffknecht, 2013. "Contextualizing Systemic Risk," ROME Working Papers 201317, ROME Network.
    20. CLICHICI, Dorina, 2015. "Rethinking The Institutional Framework For Financial Stability In The Republic Of Moldova," Journal of Financial and Monetary Economics, Centre of Financial and Monetary Research "Victor Slavescu", vol. 2(1), pages 59-66.
    21. Milne, Alistair, 2013. "Register, cap and trade: A proposal for containing systemic liquidy risk," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), vol. 7, pages 1-31.
    22. Paolo Angelini & Sergio Nicoletti-Altimari & Ignazio Visco, 2013. "Macroprudential, Microprudential and Monetary Policies: Policies, Complementarities and Trade-Offs," Chapters,in: Stability of the Financial System, chapter 22 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    23. Georges Dionne & Sara Malekan, 2017. "Optimal Form of Retention for Securitized Loans under Moral Hazard," Risks, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 5(4), pages 1-13, October.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises

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