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Asymmetric Information And The Entrepreneurial Firm: Capital Structure, Investment And Government Intervention

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  • Innes, Robert

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  • Innes, Robert, 1987. "Asymmetric Information And The Entrepreneurial Firm: Capital Structure, Investment And Government Intervention," Working Papers 225813, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:ucdavw:225813
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.225813
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