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Asymmetric Information And The Entrepreneurial Firm: Capital Structure, Investment And Government Intervention

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  • Innes, Robert

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  • Innes, Robert, 1987. "Asymmetric Information And The Entrepreneurial Firm: Capital Structure, Investment And Government Intervention," Working Papers 225813, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:ucdavw:225813
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.225813
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    9. Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-387, May.
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    31. Douglas Gale & Martin Hellwig, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 647-663.
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