IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Credit markets with asymmetric information : a survey

  • Gerhard Clemenz

    (University of Regensburg, Germany)

  • Mona Ritthaler

    (University of Regensburg, Germany)

We attempt to survey the most important implications of informational asymmetries in credit markets. First, we review the various explanations of equilibrium credit rationing, then we discuss their robustness if collateral and loan size are used as signals of credit worthiness. Then we show the importance of the modelling strategy for the conclusions derived about credit market equilibria. Finally, we discuss the role of different contracts and conclude by suggesting areas of further research.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://taloustieteellinenyhdistys.fi/images/stories/fep/f1992_1b.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by Finnish Economic Association in its journal Finnish Economic Papers.

Volume (Year): 5 (1992)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Pages: 12-26

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:fep:journl:v:5:y:1992:i:1:p:12-26
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.taloustieteellinenyhdistys.fi

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Bester,Helmut Hellwig,Martin, 1987. "Moral hazard and equilibrium credit rationing: An overview of the issues," Discussion Paper Serie A 125, University of Bonn, Germany.
  2. Barro, Robert J, 1976. "The Loan Market, Collateral, and Rates of Interest," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 8(4), pages 439-56, November.
  3. Hellwig, Martin, 1987. "Some recent developments in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection ," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 319-325.
  4. Williamson, Stephen D., 1986. "Costly monitoring, financial intermediation, and equilibrium credit rationing," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-179, September.
  5. Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V., 1987. "Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 167-182, June.
  6. Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May.
  7. Smith, Bruce, 1983. "Limited Information, Credit Rationing, and Optimal Government Lending Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 305-18, June.
  8. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
  9. Blinder, Alan S, 1987. "Credit Rationing and Effective Supply Failures," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(386), pages 327-52, June.
  10. Chateau, John Peter D., 1983. "Credit rationing as a (temporary) suboptimal equilibrium with imperfect information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 195-201.
  11. Jaffee, Dwight M & Russell, Thomas, 1976. "Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 651-66, November.
  12. Herschel I. Grossman, 1979. "Adverse Selection, Dissembling, and Competitive Equilibrium," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 336-343, Spring.
  13. Chan, Yuk-Shee & Kanatas, George, 1985. "Asymmetric Valuations and the Role of Collateral in Loan Agreements," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 17(1), pages 84-95, February.
  14. KOHLBERG, Elon & MERTENS, Jean-François, . "On the strategic stability of equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers RP -716, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  15. Riley, John G., 1975. "Competitive signalling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 174-186, April.
  16. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  17. Wette, Hildegard C, 1983. "Collateral in Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information: Note," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 442-45, June.
  18. Baltensperger, Ernst, 1980. "Alternative approaches to the theory of the banking firm," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 1-37, January.
  19. Allen, Franklin, 1983. "Credit Rationing and Payment Incentives," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 639-46, October.
  20. Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1986. "Imperfect Information, Credit Markets and Unemployment," NBER Working Papers 2093, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Guttentag, Jack & Herring, Richard, 1984. " Credit Rationing and Financial Disorder," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 39(5), pages 1359-82, December.
  22. Koskela, Erkki, 1983. "Credit rationing and non-price loan terms : A re-examination," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 405-416, September.
  23. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June.
  24. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
  25. Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-87, May.
  26. Gale, Douglas & Hellwig, Martin, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 647-63, October.
  27. Baltensperger, Ernst, 1978. "Credit Rationing: Issues and Questions," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(2), pages 170-83, May.
  28. Webb, David C, 1981. "The Net Wealth Effect of Government Bonds When Credit Markets are Imperfect," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 91(362), pages 405-14, June.
  29. Vandell, Kerry D, 1984. "Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing: Comment and Extension," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 99(4), pages 841-63, November.
  30. Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, 1988. "Banks as Social Accountants and Screening Devices for the Allocation of Credit," NBER Working Papers 2710, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  31. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1985. "Credit Markets and the Control of Capital," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 17(2), pages 133-52, May.
  32. Williamson, Stephen D, 1986. "Increasing Returns to Scale in Financial Intermediation and the Non-neuturality of Government Policy," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(5), pages 863-75, October.
  33. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July.
  34. Innes, Robert D., 1990. "Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 45-67, October.
  35. Fried, Joel & Howitt, Peter, 1980. "Credit Rationing and Implicit Contract Theory," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 12(3), pages 471-87, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fep:journl:v:5:y:1992:i:1:p:12-26. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Editorial Secretary)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.