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Political Economy of Public Deficit: Perspectives for Constitutional Reform

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Abstract

The paper uses a dynamic inconsistency model known from monetary policy to assess three alternative proposals how to reform fiscal constitution in order to limit government’s incentive to use fiscal policy for maximizing political support. The return to ever-balanced-budget rule, state-contingent rules, and the establishment of an independent Fiscal Policy Committee with power to set public deficit with the aim of stabilizing the economy are discussed from the constitutional perspective, analyzing different incentives that these proposals create for government and alternative means to enhance credibility of the arrangement.

Suggested Citation

  • Adam Geršl, 2005. "Political Economy of Public Deficit: Perspectives for Constitutional Reform," Working Papers IES 98, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
  • Handle: RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp098
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    fiscal policy; dynamic inconsistency; political economy; public deficit;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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