IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Political Economy of Public Deficit: Perspectives for Constitutional Reform

The paper uses a dynamic inconsistency model known from monetary policy to assess three alternative proposals how to reform fiscal constitution in order to limit government’s incentive to use fiscal policy for maximizing political support. The return to ever-balanced-budget rule, state-contingent rules, and the establishment of an independent Fiscal Policy Committee with power to set public deficit with the aim of stabilizing the economy are discussed from the constitutional perspective, analyzing different incentives that these proposals create for government and alternative means to enhance credibility of the arrangement.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/default/file/download/id/2833
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies in its series Working Papers IES with number 98.

as
in new window

Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision: 2005
Handle: RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp098
Contact details of provider: Postal: Opletalova 26, CZ-110 00 Prague
Phone: +420 2 222112330
Fax: +420 2 22112304
Web page: http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Karel Janda, 2005. "The Comparative Statics of the Effects of Credit Guarantees and Subsidies in the Competitive Lending Market," Working Papers IES 82, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
  2. Karel Janda, 2003. "Credit guarantees in a credit market with adverse selection," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2003(4).
  3. František Turnovec & Jacek W. Mercik & Mariusz Mazurkiewicz, 2004. "Power Indices: Shapley-Shubik OR Penrose-Banzhaf?," Working Papers IES 48, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2004.
  4. William A. Niskanen, 1992. "The Case for a New Fiscal Constitution," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 13-24, Spring.
  5. Nordhaus, William D, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 169-90, April.
  6. Pesola, Jarmo, 2001. "The role of macroeconomic shocks in banking crises," Research Discussion Papers 6/2001, Bank of Finland.
  7. Michal Bauer, 2005. "Theory of the Firm under Uncertainty: Financing, Attitude to Risk and Output Behavior," Working Papers IES 71, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
  8. Peter Tuchyòa & Martin Gregor, 2005. "Centralization Trade-off with Non-Uniform Taxes," Working Papers IES 81, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
  9. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521233293 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Wadim Strielkowski & Cathal O'Donoghue, 2005. "Ready to Go? EU Enlargement and Migration Potential: Lessons from the Czech Republic in the Context of the Irish Migration Experience," Working Papers IES 74, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
  11. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  12. Matthew B. Canzoneri, 1983. "Monetary policy games and the role of private information," International Finance Discussion Papers 249, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  13. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
  14. Marco BUTI & Werner ROEGER & Jan IN'T VELD, 2001. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions under a Stability Pact," Economics Working Papers ECO2001/08, European University Institute.
  15. Karel Janda, 2005. "The Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of the Budget Cost of the Czech Supporting and Guarantee Agricultural and Forestry Fund," Working Papers IES 86, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
  16. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521027922 is not listed on IDEAS
  17. Karel Janda, 2004. "Bankruptcy Procedures with Ex Post Moral Hazard," Working Papers IES 61, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2004.
  18. Alexis Derviz, 2005. "Cross-border Risk Transmission by a Multinational Bank," Working Papers IES 85, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
  19. Petr Hedbávný & Ondøej Schneider, 2003. "Fiscal Policy: Too Political?," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 53(11-12), pages 462-476, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp098. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lenka Herrmannova)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.