A version of this paper was published as chapter 13 of the 2005 second edition of The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (ed. J. Backhaus). This paper is the sequel of chapter 7 of the first edition.
|Date of creation:||18 Aug 2005|
|Date of revision:||19 Aug 2005|
|Note:||Type of Document - pdf; pages: 16. Keywords: Law and Economics, Constitutional Economics|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://econwpa.repec.org|
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