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Constitutional economics

Author

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  • Ludwig van den Hauwe

Abstract

A version of this paper was published as chapter 13 of the 2005 second edition of The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (ed. J. Backhaus). This paper is the sequel of chapter 7 of the first edition.

Suggested Citation

  • Ludwig van den Hauwe, 2005. "Constitutional economics," Public Economics 0508010, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Dec 2005.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0508010
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 16. Keywords: Law and Economics, Constitutional Economics
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/pe/papers/0508/0508010.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Larry Merville & Dale Osborne, 1990. "Constitutional democracy and the theory of agency," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 21-47, September.
    2. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    3. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    4. Carsten Hefeker, 1995. "Monetary union or currency competition? Currency arrangements for monetary stability in East and West," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 57-69, December.
    5. Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, 1986. "Constraining the Transfer Society: Constitutional and Moral Dimensions," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 6(1), pages 317-345, Spring/Su.
    6. James Buchanan & Dwight Lee, 1991. "Cartels, coalitions, and constitutional politics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 139-161, March.
    7. Eichengreen, Barry, 1993. "International Monetary Arrangements for the 21st Century," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers 233202, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics.
    8. Russell Sobel, 1994. "The League of Nations covenant and the United Nations charter: An analysis of two international constitutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 173-192, March.
    9. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, September.
    10. Buchanan, James M, 1993. "Public Choice after Socialism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(1), pages 67-74, September.
    11. Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 875-901, December.
    12. Randall Holcombe, 1991. "Constitutions as constraints: A case study of three american constitutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 303-328, September.
    13. James Buchanan, 1990. "The domain of constitutional economics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-18, December.
    14. Backhaus, J.G., 1995. "An economic analysis of constitutional law," Research Memorandum 011, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    15. Gordon Tullock, 1959. "Problems of Majority Voting," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(6), pages 571-571.
    16. Donald Boudreaux & A. Pritchard, 1994. "Reassessing the role of the independent judiciary in enforcing interest-group bargains," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 1-21, December.
    17. Richard Wagner, 1988. "The Calculus of consent: A Wicksellian retrospective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 153-166, February.
    18. Jack Wiseman, 1990. "Principles of political economy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 101-124, December.
    19. Anton Lowenberg & Ben Yu, 1992. "Efficient constitution formation and maintenance: The role of “exit”," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 51-72, December.
    20. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Van Den Hauwe Ludwig, 2016. "Understanding Financial Instability: Minsky Versus the Austrians," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 22(1), pages 25-60, July.
    2. Scartascini, Carlos & Stein, Ernesto H. & Tommasi, Mariano, 2008. "Political Institutions, State Capabilities and Public Policy: International Evidence," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1638, Inter-American Development Bank.
    3. Kumar, Vikas, 2011. "Negotiating constitutions for political unions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 58-76, March.
    4. Ludwig Van Den Hauwe, 2000. "The Case for Supply-Side Economics Revisited: The Effect of Time Preference," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 139-160, September.
    5. Jamil, Sarah & Neumärker, Bernhard, 2010. "A contribution to the contractual analysis of public-private partnerships," The Constitutional Economics Network Working Papers 04-2010, University of Freiburg, Department of Economic Policy and Constitutional Economic Theory.
    6. van den Hauwe, Ludwig, 2000. "The Drama Revisited," MPRA Paper 8688, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Vanberg, Viktor J., 2005. "Market and state: the perspective of constitutional political economy," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 23-49, June.
    8. Aras, Osman Nuri & Öztürk, Mustafa, 2011. "Constitutional Economics, Fiscal Policy Rules, and The Case of Turkey," MPRA Paper 81856, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Sola Juan Vicente, 2010. "The Constitutional Economy of Dynamism and Inclusion: An Inquiry into the Causes of Argentine Economic Decadence," Capitalism and Society, De Gruyter, vol. 5(3), pages 1-25, December.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H - Public Economics

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