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Efficient constitution formation and maintenance: The role of “exit”

Listed author(s):
  • Anton Lowenberg
  • Ben Yu
Registered author(s):

    A constitution will create mutual gains for all parties only if it is negotiated within an environment in which all parties possess viable exit options. The availability of exit options can substitute for a veil of uncertainty, which is difficult to operationalize in real-world settings. An efficient constitution also will be self-enforcing if it contains rules and principles geared to support political and market competition in the post-constitutional society. Again, the notion of exit is a useful way to characterize this condition for constitutional maintenance. Copyright George Mason University 1992

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    Article provided by Springer in its journal Constitutional Political Economy.

    Volume (Year): 3 (1992)
    Issue (Month): 1 (December)
    Pages: 51-72

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:3:y:1992:i:1:p:51-72
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02393232
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    1. Lowenberg, Anton D. & Yu, Ben T., 1992. "The role of the intellectual in economic development: A constitutional perspective," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 20(9), pages 1261-1277, September.
    2. Lowenberg, Anton D. & Yu, Ben T., 1990. "Constitutional environments and the contractual state: The cases of South Africa and Hong Kong," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 51-69, March.
    3. Aaron Wildavsky, 1990. "A Double Security: Federalism as Competition," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 10(1), pages 39-58, Spring/Su.
    4. Sandmo, Agnar, 1990. "Buchanan on Political Economy: A Review Article," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 28(1), pages 50-65, March.
    5. Richard E. Wagner, 2004. "Wagner on Public Choice," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 55-74, January.
    6. Buchanan, James M & Faith, Roger L, 1987. "Secession and the Limits of Taxation: Toward a Theory of Internal Exit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 1023-1031, December.
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