IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article

The quality of the legal system and labor market performance around the world

  • Horst Feldmann

    ()

Using data on 75 countries for six years in the period 1995 to 2003, this paper analyzes empirically whether and to what extent the quality of the legal system affects the performance of the labor market. According to the regression results, a legal system characterized by a dependent judiciary, biased courts, a lack of intellectual property protection and a lack of integrity increases unemployment and lowers the employment level. The magnitude of the effect seems to be substantial, particularly among young people.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10657-008-9092-4
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Springer in its journal European Journal of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 28 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (August)
Pages: 39-65

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:28:y:2009:i:1:p:39-65
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/journal/10657

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Edward C. Prescott, 2004. "Why do Americans work so much more than Europeans?," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Jul, pages 2-13.
  2. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(04), pages 803-832, December.
  3. Hausman, Jerry A, 1978. "Specification Tests in Econometrics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1251-71, November.
  4. Alberto Alesina & Arnaud Devleeschauwer & William Easterly & Sergio Kurlat & Romain Wacziarg, 2003. "Fractionalization," NBER Working Papers 9411, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Hayek, F. A., 1991. "The Fatal Conceit," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226320663 edited by Bartley, III, W. W., June.
  6. Simeon Djankov & Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, . "The Regulation of Entry," Working Paper 19462, Harvard University OpenScholar.
  7. Horst Feldmann, 2006. "Credit Market Regulation and Labor Market Performance Around the World," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 497-525, November.
  8. Horst Feldmann, 2005. "Labour Market Institutions and Labour Market Performance in Transition Countries," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(1), pages 47-82.
  9. Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael Gely, 1992. "Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(4), pages 463-492, Winter.
  10. Feld, Lars P. & Voigt, Stefan, 2003. "Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence using a new set of indicators," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 497-527, September.
  11. Neumark, David & Wascher, William, 2007. "Minimum Wages and Employment," IZA Discussion Papers 2570, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  12. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 1975. "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective," NBER Working Papers 0110, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Horst Feldmann, 2009. "The effects of hiring and firing regulation on unemployment and employment: evidence based on survey data," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(19), pages 2389-2401.
  14. Torstensson, Johan, 1994. "Property Rights and Economic Growth: An Empirical Study," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(2), pages 231-47.
  15. Gallup, J.L. & Sachs, J.D. & Mullinger, A., 1999. "Geography and Economic Development," Papers 1, Chicago - Graduate School of Business.
  16. Horst Feldmann, 2008. "Business regulation and labor market performance around the world," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 201-235, April.
  17. Andrea Bassanini & Romain Duval, 2006. "The Determinants of Unemployment across OECD Countries," Post-Print halshs-00120584, HAL.
  18. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Pop-Eleches, Cristian & Shleifer, Andrei, 2004. "Judicial Checks and Balances," Scholarly Articles 3451311, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  19. Horst Feldmann, 2006. "Government Size and Unemployment: Evidence from Industrial Countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 443-459, June.
  20. John Luke Gallup & Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew Mellinger, 1999. "Geography and Economic Development," CID Working Papers 1, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
  21. Hayek, F. A., 2011. "The Constitution of Liberty," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226315379 edited by Hamowy, Ronald, June.
  22. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-38, May.
  23. Horst Feldmann, 2009. "Geography and Labor Market Performance," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 35(2), pages 190-208.
  24. Alchian, Armen A. & Demsetz, Harold, 1973. "The Property Right Paradigm," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(01), pages 16-27, March.
  25. Keefer, Philip & Knack, Stephen, 1997. "Why Don't Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross-National Test of Institutional Explanation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 590-602, July.
  26. Juan C. Botero & Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "The Regulation of Labor," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(4), pages 1339-1382.
  27. Andrea Bassanini & Romain Duval, 2006. "The determinants of unemployment across OECD countries: Reassessing the role of policies and institutions," OECD Economic Studies, OECD Publishing, vol. 2006(1), pages 7-86.
  28. Assar Lindbeck & Dennis J. Snower, 1989. "The Insider-Outsider Theory of Employment and Unemployment," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026262074x.
  29. Horst Feldmann, 2006. "The Quality of Industrial Relations and Labour Market Performance," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 20(3), pages 559-579, 09.
  30. Jeffrey D. Sachs, 2001. "Tropical Underdevelopment," NBER Working Papers 8119, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  31. Anderson, Gary M & Shughart, William F, II & Tollison, Robert D, 1989. "On the Incentives of Judges to Enforce Legislative Wealth Transfers," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 215-28, April.
  32. E. Paul Durrenberger, 2005. "Labour," Chapters, in: A Handbook of Economic Anthropology, chapter 8 Edward Elgar Publishing.
  33. Horst Feldmann, 2003. "Labor Market Regulation and Labor Market Performance: Evidence Based on Surveys among Senior Business Executives," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 509-540, November.
  34. Stephen Nickell & Luca Nunziata & Wolfgang Ochel, 2005. "Unemployment in the OECD Since the 1960s. What Do We Know?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(500), pages 1-27, 01.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:28:y:2009:i:1:p:39-65. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)

or (Rebekah McClure)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.