IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/elg/eechap/18871_1.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Economic theory of non-territorial unbundling

In: The Political Economy of Non-Territorial Exit

Author

Listed:
  • .

Abstract

Much has been said about the vices and virtues of democracy. Democracy, said Benjamin Franklin, is two wolves and a sheep voting on what to have for dinner. Lord Acton warned that democracy is susceptible to a ‘tyranny of the majority’. Winston Churchill told us that democracy is actually the worst form of government . . . except for every other form that has been tried. Not without irony, he also said that the best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter. H. L. Mencken described democracy as the theory that people know what they want, and deserve to get it good and hard. These quotes speak to the majoritarian dimension of democracy and the reality that even in the best-of-functioning systems 49 per cent of the people can remain unhappy. To be sure, in most modern democracies even a less-than-majority popular vote can carry an election, due to the peculiarities of electoral systems.5 Democracy, in other words, is a system to ensure that some people get what they want; it is not a system to allow everyone to do so.

Suggested Citation

  • ., 2019. "Economic theory of non-territorial unbundling," Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Non-Territorial Exit, chapter 1, pages 14-38, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:18871_1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781788979375/chapter01.xhtml
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bruce L. Benson, 2000. "Private Sources of Trust and Recourse : Prerequisites for the Successful Emergence of Markets in Cyberspace," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 16(Fall 2000), pages 69-92.
    2. Ronald H. Coase, 2008. "The Institutional Structure of Production," Springer Books, in: Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley (ed.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, chapter 2, pages 31-39, Springer.
    3. Andreas Buehn & Friedrich Schneider, 2012. "Shadow economies around the world: novel insights, accepted knowledge, and new estimates," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(1), pages 139-171, February.
    4. Peter J. Boettke & Christopher J. Coyne & Peter T. Leeson, 2015. "Institutional stickiness and the New Development Economics," Chapters, in: Laura E. Grube & Virgil Henry Storr (ed.), Culture and Economic Action, chapter 6, pages 123-146, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, 1997. "On the Number and Size of Nations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1027-1056.
    6. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2010. "Exit, collective action and polycentric political systems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 143(3), pages 339-352, June.
    7. Oliver Volckart, 2002. "No Utopia: Government Without Territorial Monopoly in Medieval Central Europe," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(2), pages 325-343, June.
    8. D. Rodrik., 2015. "When Ideas Trump Interests: Preferences, Worldviews, and Policy Innovations," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 1.
    9. Viktor Vanberg & Wolfgang Kerber, 1994. "Institutional competition among jurisdictions: An evolutionary approach," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 193-219, March.
    10. Christopher Coyne & Abigail Hall, 2014. "The empire strikes back: Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and the Robust Political Economy of empire," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 27(4), pages 359-385, December.
    11. Enrico Spolaore & Alberto Alesina & Romain Wacziarg, 2000. "Economic Integration and Political Disintegration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1276-1296, December.
    12. Douglass C. North, 1990. "A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 2(4), pages 355-367, October.
    13. Nicole J. Saam & Wolfgang Kerber, 2013. "Policy Innovation, Decentralised Experimentation, and Laboratory Federalism," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 16(1), pages 1-7.
    14. William Easterly & Ross Levine, 1997. "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1203-1250.
    15. Peter Leeson & J. Subrick, 2006. "Robust political economy," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 19(2), pages 107-111, June.
    16. Yan Chen & Peter Ordeshook, 1994. "Constitutional secession clauses," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 45-60, December.
    17. Israel M. Kirzner, 1997. "Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(1), pages 60-85, March.
    18. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics and Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753.
    19. Djankov, Simeon & Glaeser, Edward & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2003. "The new comparative economics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 595-619, December.
    20. Bruni S. Frey, 1999. "The New Democratic Federalism For Europe," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1679 edited by Reiner Eichenberger.
    21. Elinor Ostrom, 2010. "Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 641-672, June.
    22. Bolton, Patrick & Roland, Gerard & Spolaore, Enrico, 1996. "Economic theories of the break-up and integration of nations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 697-705, April.
    23. Ostrom, Vincent & Tiebout, Charles M. & Warren, Robert, 1961. "The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 831-842, December.
    24. Olson, Mancur, Jr, 1969. "The Principle of "Fiscal Equivalence": The Division of Responsibilities among Different Levels of Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 479-487, May.
    25. Patrick Bolton & Gérard Roland, 1997. "The Breakup of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1057-1090.
    26. Peltzman, Sam, 1990. "How Efficient Is the Voting Market?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 27-63, April.
    27. Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1997. "Federalism as a Commitment to Reserving Market Incentives," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 83-92, Fall.
    28. Sergio Currarini & Matthew O. Jackson & Paolo Pin, 2009. "An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities, and Segregation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(4), pages 1003-1045, July.
    29. David Ellerman, 2014. "Parallel experimentation: a basic scheme for dynamic efficiency," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 259-287, October.
    30. Bruno S. Frey, 2001. "A Utopia? Government Without Territorial Monopoly," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(1), pages 162-175, March.
    31. Alberto Alesina & William Easterly & Janina Matuszeski, 2011. "Artificial States," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 246-277, April.
    32. J. B. Rosser-Jr. & M. Rosser., 2009. "A Critique of the New Comparative Economics," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 8.
    33. Deirdre McCloskey, 2015. "It was ideas and ideologies, not interests or institutions, which changed in Northwestern Europe, 1600–1848," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 57-68, January.
    34. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2005. "Identity and the Economics of Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 9-32, Winter.
    35. Oliver E. Williamson, 2000. "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(3), pages 595-613, September.
    36. Edward L. Glaeser & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 271-303, September.
    37. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Chennat Gopalakrishnan (ed.), Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, chapter 9, pages 178-203, Palgrave Macmillan.
    38. Alberto Alesina & Reza Baqir & William Easterly, 1999. "Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1243-1284.
    39. Sandler, Todd & Tschirhart, John T, 1980. "The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1481-1521, December.
    40. Buchanan, James M, 1987. "The Constitution of Economic Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 243-250, June.
    41. Wang, Jin, 2013. "The economic impact of Special Economic Zones: Evidence from Chinese municipalities," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 133-147.
    42. Sheila C. Dow & Peter E. Earl (ed.), 1999. "Contingency, Complexity and the Theory of the Firm," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1884.
    43. Tabarrok, Alexander, 1998. "The Private Provision of Public Goods via Dominant Assurance Contracts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 96(3-4), pages 345-362, September.
    44. Schneider,Friedrich & Enste,Dominik H., 2016. "The Shadow Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781316600894, May.
    45. Whitford, Andrew & Lee, Soo-Young, 2012. "Disorder, dictatorship and government effectiveness: cross-national evidence," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(1), pages 5-31, March.
    46. Buchanan, James M. & Goetz, Charles J., 1972. "Efficiency limits of fiscal mobility: An assessment of the tiebout model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 25-43, April.
    47. Todd Sandler & John Tschirhart, 1997. "Club theory: Thirty years later," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 335-355, December.
    48. Richard Wagner, 2012. "Rationality, political economy, and fiscal responsibility: wrestling with tragedy on the fiscal commons," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 261-277, September.
    49. Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A., 2006. "Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(1), pages 115-131, February.
    50. Peter Boettke & Christopher Coyne & Peter Leeson & Frederic Sautet, 2005. "The New Comparative Political Economy," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 18(3), pages 281-304, December.
    51. Buchanan, James M & Faith, Roger L, 1987. "Secession and the Limits of Taxation: Toward a Theory of Internal Exit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 1023-1031, December.
    52. Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth Lee Sokoloff, 2002. "Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development Among New World Economies," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Fall 2002), pages 41-110, August.
    53. Giuseppe Eusepi & Richard E. Wagner, 2011. "States as Ecologies of Political Enterprises," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(4), pages 573-585, October.
    54. Gordon Tullock, 1981. "Why so much stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 189-204, January.
    55. Jeffry M. Netter & William L. Megginson, 2001. "From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 321-389, June.
    56. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December.
    57. Bhaskar Vira, 1997. "The Political Coase Theorem: Identifying Differences between Neoclassical and Critical Institutionalism," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(3), pages 761-780, September.
    58. Moberg, Lotta, 2015. "The political economy of special economic zones," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 167-190, March.
    59. Teppo Felin & Stuart Kauffman & Roger Koppl & Giuseppe Longo, 2014. "Economic Opportunity and Evolution: Beyond Landscapes and Bounded Rationality," Post-Print hal-01415115, HAL.
    60. Cheung, Steven N S, 1969. "Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(1), pages 23-42, April.
    61. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416-416.
    62. James Buchanan, 1990. "The domain of constitutional economics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-18, December.
    63. Buchanan, James M & Vanberg, Viktor J, 2002. "Constitutional Implications of Radical Subjectivism," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 15(2-3), pages 121-129, June.
    64. Samuel DeCanio, 2014. "Democracy, the Market, and the Logic of Social Choice," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 58(3), pages 637-652, July.
    65. Parisi, Francesco, 2003. "Political Coase Theorem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 115(1-2), pages 1-36, April.
    66. Wolfgang Kerber, 2006. "Competition, Knowledge, and Institutions," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(2), pages 457-463, June.
    67. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    68. Obinger, Herbert, 1998. "Federalism, Direct Democracy, and Welfare State Development in Switzerland," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(3), pages 241-263, December.
    69. Buchanan, James M. & Yoon, Yong J., 2004. "Majoritarian exploitation of the fiscal commons: general taxes-differential transfers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 73-90, March.
    70. Peter T. Leeson, 2007. "Balkanization and assimilation: Examining the effects of state-created homogeneity," Review of Social Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 65(2), pages 141-164.
    71. Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi, 2003. "The Disunity of Unanimity," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 83-94, June.
    72. Stringham, Edward Peter, 2015. "Private Governance: Creating Order in Economic and Social Life," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199365166.
    73. Friedrich Schneider & Andreas Buehn & Claudio Montenegro, 2010. "New Estimates for the Shadow Economies all over the World," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(4), pages 443-461.
    74. Friedman, David, 1977. "A Theory of the Size and Shape of Nations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(1), pages 59-77, February.
    75. Weingast, Barry R, 1995. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, April.
    76. Paul Romer, 2010. "Technologies, Rules, and Progress: The Case for Charter Cities," Working Papers id:2471, eSocialSciences.
    77. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1950. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 328-328.
    78. Thomke, Stefan & von Hippel, Eric & Franke, Roland, 1998. "Modes of experimentation: an innovation process--and competitive--variable," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 315-332, July.
    79. Birgir Solvason, 1993. "Institutional evolution in the Icelandic Commonwealth," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 97-125, December.
    80. Milanovic, Branko, 2000. "The median-voter hypothesis, income inequality, and income redistribution: an empirical test with the required data," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 367-410, September.
    81. Keith Jakee & Stephen Turner, 2002. "The Welfare State as a Fiscal Commons: Problems of Incentives Versus Problems of Cognition," Public Finance Review, , vol. 30(6), pages 481-508, November.
    82. Robin Hahnel & Kristen Sheeran, 2009. "Misinterpreting the Coase Theorem," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(1), pages 215-238.
    83. Gordon Tullock, 1959. "Problems of Majority Voting," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67, pages 571-571.
    84. Grégoire Rota Graziosi, 2007. "Secession and the Limits of Taxation: Toward a Theory of Internal Exit: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 534-538, March.
    85. Peltzman, Sam, 1976. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 211-240, August.
    86. Olson, Mancur, 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 567-576, September.
    87. Anthony Scott, 1955. "The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63, pages 116-116.
    88. Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, 2012. "Politics with(out) Coase," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 59(2), pages 175-187, July.
    89. Stringham, Edward Peter & Zywicki, Todd J., 2011. "Hayekian anarchism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 290-301, May.
    90. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    91. Robert Young, 1994. "The political economy of secession: The case of Quebec," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 221-245, March.
    92. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124-124.
    93. Leeson, Peter T., 2011. "Government, clubs, and constitutions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 301-308.
    94. Peter T. Leeson, 2006. "Cooperation and Conflict," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(4), pages 891-907, October.
    95. Anton Lowenberg & Ben Yu, 1992. "Efficient constitution formation and maintenance: The role of “exit”," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 51-72, December.
    96. Boettke, Peter & Coyne, Christopher (ed.), 2015. "The Oxford Handbook of Austrian Economics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199811762.
    97. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter & Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard, 2003. "Rational Bandits: Plunder, Public Goods, and the Vikings," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 117(3-4), pages 255-272, December.
    98. Carsten Herrmann-Pillath, 2009. "Diversity, identity, and the indeterminacy of the size of nations," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 15-38, February.
    99. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    100. Casella, Alessandra & Frey, Bruno, 1992. "Federalism and clubs : Towards an economic theory of overlapping political jurisdictions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 639-646, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Anna Misztal & Magdalena Kowalska & Anita Fajczak-Kowalska & Otakar Strunecky, 2021. "Energy Efficiency and Decarbonization in the Context of Macroeconomic Stabilization," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(16), pages 1-18, August.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Trent J. MacDonald, 2019. "The Political Economy of Non-Territorial Exit," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 18871.
    2. Darcy W E Allen, 2020. "When Entrepreneurs Meet:The Collective Governance of New Ideas," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number q0269, July.
    3. Vahabi,Mehrdad, 2019. "The Political Economy of Predation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107591370, May.
    4. Steven G. Medema, 2020. "The Coase Theorem at Sixty," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1045-1128, December.
    5. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2011. "Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9624.
    6. Ennio E. Piano, 2019. "State capacity and public choice: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 289-309, January.
    7. Coyne,Christopher J., 2020. "Defense, Peace, and War Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108724036, May.
    8. Djankov, Simeon & Glaeser, Edward & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2003. "The new comparative economics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 595-619, December.
    9. Glenn Furton & Adam Martin, 2019. "Beyond market failure and government failure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 197-216, January.
    10. Kjell Hausken & John F. Knutsen, 2002. "The Birth, Adjustment and Death of States," Public Economics 0205004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Wallace Oates, 2005. "Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 12(4), pages 349-373, August.
    12. Libman, Alexander Mikhailovich, 2009. "Эндогенные Границы И Распределение Власти В Федерациях И Международных Сообществах [ENDOGENOUS BOUNDARIES AND DISTRIBUTION OF POWER In the Federation]," MPRA Paper 16473, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    14. Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, 2002. "Types of Multi-Level Governance," Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po 3, Centre d'études européennes (CEE) at Sciences Po, Paris.
    15. Brandi, Clara & Wohlgemuth, Michael, 2006. "Strategies of Flexible Integration and Enlargement of the European Union: a Club-theoretical and Constitutional Economics Perspective," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 06/7, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    16. Palagashvili,Liya & Piano,Ennio & Skarbek,David, 2017. "The Decline and Rise of Institutions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781316649176, May.
    17. Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, 2003. "Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2028, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    18. Hausken, Kjell & Knutsen, John F., 2010. "An enabling mechanism for the creation, adjustment, and dissolution of states and governmental units," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 4, pages 1-38.
    19. Alexander William Salter & Andrew T. Young, 2019. "Polycentric Sovereignty: The Medieval Constitution, Governance Quality, and the Wealth of Nations," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1241-1253, June.
    20. Filippo Gregorini, 2007. "Political Geography and Income Inequalities," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Teoria Economica e Metodi Quantitativi itemq0746, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:18871_1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: http://www.e-elgar.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Darrel McCalla (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.e-elgar.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.