Club Theory: Thirty Years Later
This paper presents a self-contained survey of club theory with an emphasis on the contributions of the last fifteen years. Club goods are contrasted with pure public goods, and equilibrium and optimality notions are contrasted. After presenting three basic representations of club theory, we focus on recent advances and generalizations that include heterogeneous memberships, transaction costs, uncertain utilization, asymmetric information, and noncompetitive influences. An agenda for research is indicated that includes further analysis of asymmetric information, institutional structure, and applications. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997
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|Date of creation:||01 Dec 1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Public Choice, December 1997, vol. 93 no. 3-4, pp. 335-355|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070|
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
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Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
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