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Culture and the regulation of entry

Author

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  • Davis, Lewis S.
  • Williamson, Claudia R.

Abstract

Does culture affect the manner in which a society regulates the entry of new firms? Our results suggest it does. We find more individualistic countries regulate entry more lightly. We investigate how culture matters presenting evidence of significant interactions between individualism and formal legal and political institutions. Individualism has a greater impact on entry regulation in societies with democratic political institutions or a common law tradition. This outcome is consistent with the idea that culture influences social preference for regulation, and political and legal institutions determine the degree to which those preferences are expressed as policy outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Davis, Lewis S. & Williamson, Claudia R., 2016. "Culture and the regulation of entry," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(4), pages 1055-1083.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:44:y:2016:i:4:p:1055-1083
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2016.09.007
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    Keywords

    Culture; Regulation of entry; Individualism; Legal origins; Democracy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law

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