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Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect

  • Daniel Berkowitz
  • Katharina Pistor
  • Jean-Francois Richard

We analyze the determinants of effective legal institutions (legality) using data from 49 countries. We show that the way the law was initially transplanted and received is a more important determinant than the supply of law from a particular legal family. Countries that have developed legal orders internally, adapted the transplanted law, and/or had a population that was already familiar with basic principles of the transplanted law have more effective legality than countries that received foreign law without any similar pre-dispositions. The transplanting process has a strong indirect effect on economic development via its impact on legality.

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Paper provided by Center for International Development at Harvard University in its series CID Working Papers with number 39.

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Date of creation: Mar 2000
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Handle: RePEc:wop:cidhav:39
Contact details of provider: Postal: Center for International Development at Harvard University (CID). 79 John F. Kennedy Street, Cambridge, MA 02138.
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Web page: http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidwp/
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